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1 Introduction 
 
In 1969, the United States began increasing the American deliveries of arms to Israel. By 
1974, Israel had become the recipient of the highest amounts of American foreign aid in the 
world. Since the beginning of Richard Nixon’s presidency, the administration was convinced 
that a strong Israel would benefit American interests in the Middle East, and halt the spread of 
Soviet influence in the region. As a result, Israel had become an important strategic ally to the 
United States in the Cold War conflict that should be rewarded accordingly. 
Increasing the Middle Eastern arms race was one of the consequences of the strategies 
implemented by the Nixon Administration from 1969 to 1974. Initially, this was not 
something Washington sought to pursue, but by the end of Nixon’s presidency in 1974, the 
United States’ arms sales and deliveries to Israel had resulted in the Middle East becoming 
the arena for a superpower tug-of-war. Despite arms limitation treaties, both the U.S. and the 
Soviet Union had amplified the tensions in the region by strengthening its allies’ military 
defences. 
Throughout this period, Israel received some of the United States’ most sophisticated and 
advanced military equipment, and got the strongest military defence in the Middle East. No 
Arab state could compete with the Israeli Defence Force (IDF), and Israel proved to be nearly 
invincible in the battlefield. From 1969 to 1974, the relationship between the United States 
and Israel transformed. Since the creation of Israel in 1948, the U.S. had, to a certain extent, 
remained neutral. This would slowly change when President Kennedy sold HAWK surface-
to-air missiles to Israel in 1962, and President Johnson made a deal with Israel for deliveries 
of Phantom and Skyhawk aircrafts in 1968. This policy on arms sales to Israel reached new 
heights when President Nixon and his National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger took office 
in the White House in January 1969.
1
  
This thesis examines both primary documents and secondary sources to answer these 
questions. The study was not conducted to be yet another description of the special 
relationship between the United States and Israel, but rather to determine how much this 
                                                 
1
 Kochavi, Noam 2009. Nixon and Israel. Forging a Conservative Partnership. Albany: State University of New 
York: 4 
2 
 
connection affected the strategies of American foreign policy-makers. In the 1970s, Israel 
sought to obtain a long-term commitment from the United States, both to support its projected 
military expenditures and to support rapid economic development. Israel believed that both 
goals – “more guns and more butter” – were necessary, and so did the policymakers in the 
White House during the Nixon years.
2
  
What were the motives behind the American arms policy towards Israel in the period between 
1969 and 1974? What kinds of weapons, and in what quantities, were sold to Israel? Why was 
this military assistance so extensive? 
American foreign policy in the Middle East 
The American foreign policies with regards to the Middle East throughout the majority of 
time between 1948 and 1974 were deeply affected by the tensions connected to the Cold War. 
The U.S.’ power was diminishing while the Soviet Union’s power improved, and the outbreak 
of several international crises in the 1960s and 1970s made this a challenging era for the 
makers of U.S. foreign policy.
3
 The U.S. foreign policy-makers believed that military power 
was an important tool for shaping the world in favour of the United States. By keeping the 
Israeli military defence strong, Nixon and Kissinger believed that the balance of power in the 
Middle East would remain unchanged, and stability in the region as a whole would persist.
4
 In 
a memorandum from Nixon to Kissinger in 1970, Nixon wrote that the U.S. interests in the 
Middle East “are basically pro-freedom and not just pro-Israel because of the Jewish vote. We 
are for Israel because Israel in our view is the only state in the Mideast which is pro-freedom 
and an effective opponent to Soviet expansion.”5 
In the first years of Richard Nixon’s presidency, he agreed with the State Department that 
regional instability in the Middle East was favourable to the Soviet Union. They believed that 
this would influence the Arab countries to be more dependent on the Kremlin, and the spread 
of communism would be imminent. This was one of the United States’ greatest fears, that the 
Soviet Union would increase its power and threaten American interests and allies in the 
                                                 
2
 Memorandum for the President, 17 September 1970. Subject: Financial Assistance for Israel. Source: National 
Archives (NA), Nixon Presidential Materials (NPM), Memo Saunders to HAK, 4/9/70, NSC, H-Files, Box H-
171. 
3
 Logevall, Fredrik and Preston, Andrew (eds.) 2008. Nixon in the World. American Foreign Relations (1969-
1977). New York: Oxford University Press Inc.: 4 
4
 Logevall and Preston 2008: 129 
5
 Quoted in Christison, Kathleen 2001. Perceptions of Palestine. Their influence on U.S. Middle East Policy. 
California: University of California Press, Ltd.: 130 
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region. Nixon and Kissinger had a great confidence in the power of having strong allies, and 
Israel became one of those. The Nixon Administration came to consider Israel an important 
strategic partner that could project American interests in the region, and maintain the balance 
of power in the Middle East.  
The President came to office believing that the Arab world “had aligned itself with Moscow 
because the United States had not been impartial, and he espoused ‘evenhandedness.’ 
Kissinger, however, believed that the way to combat the Soviets in the Middle East was to 
strengthen U.S. allies while weakening Soviet allies and undermining their confidence in the 
Soviets.”6 At the end of Nixon’s presidency, it was Kissinger’s view that had been the 
winning strategy applied to the American approach in the Middle East. 
From 1971 onwards, the United States drastically increased its supply of military and 
financial aid to Israel. This was demonstrated by the first long-term arms deal with Jerusalem 
in December 1971.
7
 The escalation of financial aid was also apparent, rising from around 
$102 million in 1970, to $643.5 million in 1971. 85 per cent of these funding’s consisted of 
military assistance. After the October War in 1973, the aid to Israel increased fivefold, 
stabilising at around $3 billion a year in loans and grants, making Israel the largest recipient 
of American foreign assistance in the world.
8
 
During the final stages of the October War in 1973, the American government carried out a 
massive airlift to Israel that came to prove crucial for the outcome of the war. This package 
improved the Israeli Defence Force (IDF) and made sure that the Soviet deliveries of military 
equipment to Egypt and Syria did not surpass the U.S.’ deliveries to Israel. As such, the 
balance of power in the Middle East remained unchanged. Nixon also approved an aid bill to 
Israel, worth $2.2 billion. The bill was intended to help Israel recover after the war, both to 
manage payment for the airlift and also to provide the means for rebuilding the army. 
9
 In the 
decades that followed Nixon’s resignation from office in 1974, American aid to Israel would 
continue to grow, and Israel and the United States would remain its close relationship.
10
 Why 
did the Israelis have such a power over the American government?  
                                                 
6
 Christison 2001: 126 
7
 Kochavi 2009: 4; see chapter 4 
8
 Mearsheimer and Walt 2007: 26 
9
 Kochavi 2009: 8; Eifram, Karsh 1997, Israel, in Yezid Sayigh and Avi Shlaim (eds), The Cold War and the 
Middle East. New York: Oxford University Press Inc.: 166 
10
 Shlaim, Avi 2000. The Iron Wall. Israel and the Arab World. London: Penguin Books: 306; see chapter 4 
4 
 
The American Government and the making of foreign policy 
To understand the decision-making process within the American bureaucracy with regards to 
the foreign policies concerning Israel and the United States’ weapon sales to the country, one 
has to study the American political system. The main institution for developing foreign policy 
in the U.S. Government is the Department of State (State Department), in correspondence 
with the Congress.
11
 The State Department is administered by the Secretary of State, who is in 
command of the foreign policy-making and is in charge of the department and its staff. The 
State Department did not initially believe that the tensions in the Middle East were caused by 
increased Soviet influence. The department believed the increasing problems were local, and 
that this was the problem the U.S. should focus on.
12
  
The President and his staff in the White House are the second main institution in the United 
States Government. The White House was centred on defeating the Soviet Union, and 
building a network of allies that could help the United States reach its goals.
13
 Many of the 
foreign policy decisions were decided upon because of concern for the Soviet Union’s 
expansion, and many of the arms sales to the region were either made or denied because of 
this interest.
14
 The National Security Council (NSC) is the President’s principal forum for 
considering national security and foreign policy matters. The council is chaired by the 
President. Its regular attendees are the Vice President, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of 
Treasury, the Secretary of Defence, the Assistant to the President for National Security 
Affairs and many more. The NSC continually works out policy options for the President to 
decide on.
15
  
When Nixon took office, he immediately revitalised this system. He wanted it to be the 
“principal forum for consideration of policy issues” and established several inter-agency 
committees to assist the NSC’s work. 16 The man Nixon put in charge of the new NSC was his 
National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger. He was also the chairman of the newly 
                                                 
11
 Shannon, Vaughn P. 2003. Balancing Act. U.S. Foreign Policy and the Arab-Israeli Conflict. Burlington: 
Ashgate: 28; Zernichiw, Simen 2010. The Palestine Option. US Policy Towards the Palestinian Armed 
Movement 1965-1973. MA Thesis in History, University of Oslo,: 3 
12
 Christison 2001: 126 
13
 ibid 
14
 Quandt 2005: 16 
15
 Terry, Janice J. 2005. U.S. Foreign Policy in the Middle East. The Role of Lobbies and Special Interest 
Groups. London: Pluto Press: 29 
16
 Quandt 2005: 57; Daalder, Ivo H., and Destler, I. M., 2009. In the Shadow of the Oval Office. Profiles of the 
National Security Advisers and the Presidents They Served – From JFK to George W. Bush. New York: Simon 
& Schuster, Inc.: 94 
5 
 
established National Security Council Review Group, which would review different policy 
studies in the form of National Security Study Memoranda (NSSM). These, in turn, were to 
be discussed by a Senior Review Group (SRG) and then referred to the full NSC board for 
discussion and decision. After this, a National Security Decision Memorandum (NSDM) 
would be issued.
17
 Neither Nixon nor Kissinger trusted the State Department and what it 
could accomplish. They wanted to have complete control over the foreign policy making, and 
this would be done from the White House. Therefore, Nixon and Kissinger created “back 
channels” that would enable them to deal directly with different foreign governments in secret 
from the State Department and others.
18
  
 
American interests in the Middle East 
The U.S.’ strategies concerning the Middle East during the Nixon administration were 
vulnerable to influence from several factors. These factors might affect the policymaker’s 
attitudes, assessments and decisions, and in the United States government, there were 
especially three levels of influence that could impact the way U.S. foreign policy-making was 
formed and executed. The three different levels of influence were its global strategic interests, 
such as the Middle East; domestic political interests, such as the Israel lobby and the 
American population; and third, the influence of the individual policymaker. All of these 
different levels affected the American policy-making with regards to Israel and the arms sale 
to the country in the 1970s. 
Global strategic interests 
The first level of influence on the American foreign policy-making was affected by the U.S. 
government’s desire to undermine the Arab states confidence in that the Soviet Union could 
produce a diplomatic process and achieve peace in the region so this, in turn, might reduce the 
threat of communist infiltration and dependence of Soviet aid.
19
 Several of the decisions made 
in regards to the Middle East during the Cold War were influenced by the desire to contain 
the spread of communism and the Soviet Union’s influence throughout the world. The 
American decision makers believed that a strong Israel would help achieving this goal, and 
                                                 
17
 Quandt 2005: 57; Daalder and Destler 2009: 94 
18
 Daalder and Destler 2009: 95; Logevall and Preston 2008: 5 
19
 Christison 2001: 126 
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justified the deliveries of military equipment and financial aid to Israel between 1969 and 
1974 with this argument.
20
  
Secondly, by having several reliable allies in the area, access to oil would be assured. Oil has 
always been an important reason for the United States to pay special attention to the Middle 
East, as American oil companies were active in developing the oil resources in the area. These 
oil reserves came with a low production cost and were therefore very important for the larger 
oil consuming states in the world.
21
 By having a close and powerful ally in the region, the 
American government believed that Israel could help stop Soviet influence and consequently 
maintain the United States’ other interests in the region, such as securing the deliveries and 
recovery of oil.
22
  As a result, through the majority of the period from 1948 until the mid-
1960s, the United States provided Israel with few arms and only modest amounts of aid.
23
  
The third, and final, policy was to help create an environment that would be in favour of the 
American commercial interest in the Middle East.
24
 The U.S. wanted to have as many allies in 
the world as possible, but the strong backing of Israel made this more difficult during the 
Nixon Administration. 
Domestic political interests 
The American policies in the 1970s were also very much influenced by domestic political 
interests and pressure. The Congress had the ability to pressure the President into not forming 
policies that could be deemed as unfavourable to Israel. This was due to the Congress being 
sensitive to pressure, more so than the President and the White House. During the 1970s, the 
Congress was strongly affected by pro-Israeli sentiment. The Jewish population within the 
United States was, and still is, small in numbers but supported the presidential campaigns 
with large donations, in addition to the Senate elections. The Jewish voters also have high 
turnout rates in the most important areas.
25
  
                                                 
20
 Christison 2001: 126; Quandt 2005: 61-62 
21
 Quandt 2005: 12 
22
 Quandt 2005: 11-12 
23
 Quandt 2005: 13 
24
 Karp, Candace 2005. Missed Opportunities. US Diplomatic Failures and the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1947-1967. 
California: Regina Books: iii; Quandt 2005: 11-15 
25
 Mearsheimer and Walt 2007: 163-164; Christison 2001: 136-137; Yaqub, Salim. The Weight of Conquest: 
Henry Kissinger and the Arab-Israeli Conflict, in Logevall, Fredrik and Preston, Andrew: Nixon in the World. 
American Foreign Relations, 1969-1977. New York 2007: Oxford University Press: 230 
7 
 
There were many active supporters for the Jewish cause and for increased military assistance 
for Israel. These supporters could be defined as part of the Israel lobby as, under American 
law, a lobbyist is defined as “an individual or organisation whose job is to influence the 
passing or defeat of legislation and who receives money for that purpose.”26 The Israel lobby 
is not defined by ethnicity or religion but by a political agenda. Consequently, it was 
important for the American President, in the making of foreign policies, to consider domestic 
demands from such interest groups, as he himself is a product of the political system.
27
 
The Israeli lobbying groups, such as the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC), 
had a major impact on domestic policies, legislation and congressional votes, especially 
during the Nixon Administration. This was achieved through the use of personal contacts and 
financial contributions. AIPAC was formed before the creation of Israel in 1948, and have 
been actively lobbying in the United States since. Its goals were to ensure that American 
foreign policies were evolving in a direction that would benefit the Zionist interest. Zion is the 
Jewish word for Jerusalem, and represented a long-term dream of a Jewish return to the holy 
land.
28
 To avoid any confusion, the Israel lobby is referred to as the Zionist lobby when 
mentioned before 1948.  
Furthermore, among the American population, only around 2-3 per cent were of Jewish faith.  
Although their numbers were small, there were a lot of other pro-Israeli groups in the 
American society, such as the Zionist Organization of America (ZOA) and Christians United 
for Israel (CUFI). According to the historians John J. Mearsheimer and Stephen M. Walt, the 
Christian Zionists “viewed the establishment of the Jewish state as the fulfilment of biblical 
prophecy. Genesis says that God gave Abraham and his descendants the land of Israel; by 
colonizing the West Bank, Jews are merely taking back what God gave them.”29  In fact, the 
support for Israel was so big in the beginning of the 1970s that the Jewish state was lightly 
referred to as the United States’ 51st state among the American population.30  
The lobbies’ influence in the higher organs of the U.S. government also developed greatly 
during the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations. The Jewish society grew considerably, and 
both Kennedy and Johnson had many Jewish advisers in their administrations, among their 
                                                 
26
 Terry 2005: 29; Quandt 2005: 8-11 
27
 Terry 2005: 29; Mearsheimer and Walt 2007: 132 
28
 Mearsheimer and Walt 2007: 115; Waage, Hilde Henriksen 2013. Konflikt og Stormaktspolitikk i Midtøsten. 
Kristiansand: Cappelen Damm AS.: 115 
29
 Mearsheimer & Walt 2006: 107  
30
 Waage 2013: 344 
8 
 
financial donors and personal friends. The War of Attrition in 1969-1970, and the October 
War in 1973 contributed to an increased focus in the pro-Israeli lobbies to ensure Israel’s 
safety and domestic growth, and made it more difficult for the Nixon Administration to pass 
legislation that was not living up to the lobbies’ expectations.31  
The individual policymaker 
The third and final level of influence concerning the United States’ foreign policy-making 
was that of the individual policymaker. Their influence is important to understand in order to 
assist in exposing the U.S. arms sales towards Israel, and why this became so immense. The 
individual, such as the President or the Secretary of State, formulates policies, but in what 
ways can the individual’s psychological traits affect the outcome of a policy? Professor in 
political science, William B. Quandt explains,   
Small adjustments in a person’s perceptions, in the weight accorded to one issue as opposed to 
another, can lead to substantial shifts of emphasis, of nuance, and therefore of action… 
Policymakers do not change from being pro-Israeli to being pro-Arab overnight, but crises may 
bring into focus new relations among issues or raise the importance of one interest, thus leading 
to changes in policy. Basic values will remain intact, but perceptions and understanding of 
relationships may quickly change.
32                                                                                                                                                  
A policymaker develops his/her beliefs, perspectives and perceptions during childhood and 
early adult lives, and these beliefs are under constant development throughout their lives. A 
person can change his or her former beliefs and replace them with new ones.
33
 Some 
policymakers were more prone to outside pressure than others, such as President Truman in 
the late 1940s, whilst others were able to keep these pressures at a minimum, such as 
President Eisenhower in the 1950s. However, these historical figures were working under 
different circumstances, both domestically and internationally and may have been affected by 
these considerations in their making of foreign policy.
34
 
 
 
 
                                                 
31
 Mearsheimer and Walt 2007: 118-119 
32
 Quandt 2005: 19-20 
33
 Zernichow 2010: 7 
34
 Quandt 2005: 18-19 
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The Nixon Administration 
Richard M. Nixon was inaugurated on 20 January 1969, and was forced to resign from office 
on 9 August 1974 following the Watergate scandal. Nixon served as Dwight D. Eisenhower’s 
Vice President for 8 years and had been involved in the making of important foreign policy 
decisions during the 1950s. Therefore, Nixon regarded his experience in international affairs 
as one of his strongest assets, and foreign relations as a particularly important arena for 
presidential action.
35
 He was a skilled politician, and had earned a reputation as a tough-
minded anti-communist, as well as an advocate of a strong international role for the United 
States.
36
  
Richard Nixon admired strength and toughness, and firmly believed that foreign policy should 
be formulated in secret, “with only minimal contributions from the Congress and public 
opinion.”37 Because of this, Nixon chose Henry Kissinger as his National Security Advisor, 
and later concurrently as Secretary of State (1969-1977). Kissinger is a former Harvard 
Professor, and a strong advocate for increased Israeli military and financial aid. He is a 
Jewish-German immigrant and was very concerned about the European Jews after the 
Holocaust and World War II. He was a strong advocate for a Jewish national home and 
wanted to reclaim the United States’ position in world affairs as an important player after the 
Vietnam War in the 1960s and 1970s. Kissinger stressed the importance of private diplomacy 
“and operating out of the public eye through a series of back channels and secret negotiations, 
Kissinger orchestrated the era of détente with the Soviet Union and the opening to China in 
1971. He managed to negotiate the American exit from Vietnam by early 1973.” 38 Through 
his shuttle diplomacy in the aftermath of the October War in 1973, Kissinger secured the 
U.S.’ position as a major diplomatic power and protected its leading position in the Middle 
East.
39
 Nixon and Kissinger did not always get along, though were an effective team when 
they did. Before Kissinger was elected Secretary of State, replacing William P. Rogers in 
September 1973, he had devoted little time and energy to the issues that were dividing the 
                                                 
35
 Quandt 2005: 55 
36
 Logevall and Preston 2007: 4 
37
 Quandt 2005: 56 
38
 Hanhimäki, Jussi 2004. The Flawed Architect. Henry Kissinger and American Foreign Policy. New York: 
Oxford University Press Inc.: xvi 
39
 ibid 
10 
 
Middle East. Only a possible confrontation with the Soviet Union as a result from growing 
tensions in the region, and the survival of Israel, could evoke his interest. 
40
 
For the position of Secretary of State, Nixon initially chose a close personal friend, William P. 
Rogers (1969-1973). He had served as Attorney General in Eisenhower’s administration, and 
had a degree from law school. Rogers was not particularly experienced in foreign policy-
making and was chosen as the Secretary of State precisely because he knew little about 
diplomacy and could keep a low profile. Therefore, he was regularly cut out of policymaking, 
as was the Secretary of Defence Melvin Laird (1969-1973).
41
   
Usually, American policymakers had only a general idea or thoughts about what had 
happened in the Middle East and what the United States’ own strategies and interests should 
be related to the region and Israel. One reason for this could be lack of knowledge. Before 
Nixon became president, there had really never been an American politician with a deep 
understanding of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Consequently, American policy-makers seemed 
reluctant to abandon central beliefs, or recent political lines that had been conducted in the 
Middle East. Because of this, they were also able to abandon failed policies and move on; this 
was often successful. One simple change in judgement could lead to a major reassessment of 
American policy.
42
 Professor William B. Quandt teaches us again that: 
There is no accepted wisdom. Each president and his top advisers must evaluate the realities of the 
Middle East, of the international environment, of the domestic front, and of human psychology before 
reaching a subjective judgement. While positions tend to be predictable, policies are not. They are the 
realm where leadership makes all the difference. And part of leadership is knowing when a policy has 
failed and should be replaced with another.
43
 
 
Literature 
There have been countless studies conducted on American foreign policy between 1969 and 
1974, with special emphasis on the U.S.’ relationship with Israel. Several of these accounts 
contain some information about the American arms sale to Israel, but no grand study has been 
performed on this subject. Many authors review Israel’s nuclear adventure, which was started 
in the late 1950s, and the United States’ failure to stop the Israelis from acquiring a nuclear 
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 Quandt 2005: 130 
41
 Quandt 2005: 57; Logevall and Preston 2007: 5 
42
 Quandt 2005: 10 
43
 Quandt 2005: 7 
11 
 
capacity. This caused resentment from the Arab countries in the Middle East toward the U.S., 
and made it more difficult to continue an even-handed approach towards the region. Avner 
Cohen’s chapter Israel in Hans Born, Bates Gill, and Heiner Hänggi’s Governing the Bomb, 
chronicle Israel’s nuclear program and deal with the nuclear reactor Dimona and Israel’s 
nuclear opacity. Avner Yaniv’s Deterrence Without the Bomb provides additional information 
regarding the subject of Israel’s nuclear program. Donald Neff’s Fallen Pillars contains some 
information about the subject as well, in addition to arms deliveries during the Kennedy, 
Johnson, and Nixon administrations.
44
 These books offer a valuable overview of Israel’s road 
towards a nuclear capacity and the United States’ relations to this, as well as shed light on the 
U.S. arms sale to Israel. 
A significant body of scholars describe the American foreign policy-making in the 1970s. 
One of the most valuable works to this thesis is William B. Quandt’s Peace Process. 
Professor Quandt is a former National Security Council member from the administrations of 
Nixon and Carter and offers invaluable inside knowledge of policymaking and how the 
decisions were taken to the highest levels of government. Kathleen Christion’s Perceptions of 
Palestine, and Avi Shlaim Iron Wall, offers a broader account of U.S. Middle Eastern history 
and the Arab-Israeli wars.
45
  
Concerning the important policymakers during this period, several works provide essential 
information on how Nixon conducted tasks and duties the presidency required: why both 
Nixon and Kissinger formed and exercised American strategies and policies, and how much 
domestic and international pressure had a say in their perceptions of the Arab-Israeli conflict. 
Nixon had many great triumphs as well as tragic failures, and has attracted the interest of 
many scholars and interested readers. Detailed accounts of both Nixon and Kissinger’s 
executions of different strategies concerning the Middle East, and especially the arms sales to 
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the region, are helpful in creating a background for the surroundings when working with the 
primary source materials.
46
  
 
 
 
Primary sources  
Although there are several books and studies that contain information regarding the U.S. arms 
sale to Israel between 1969 and 1974, no detailed account has been found. Therefore, primary 
source material can help fill this gap. The main focus of primary document materials would 
be the records of the White House, since these are more important for the period under study. 
Nixon and Kissinger were the main legislators in the making of foreign policy during this 
time, with back-channel diplomacy and the improving of détente and the NSC, and the White 
House was the most important centre of foreign policy power in the 1970s.  
The brunt of the archival research for this study was performed among the records of the 
Nixon presidency at the Nixon library in Yorba Linda, California. The archive contains a vast 
amount of documents, but despite of the normal 30-year declassification schedule, several 
important documents are still not released. These would likely have been of high value to this 
study. Among these classified documents is the National Security Study Memorandum 
(NSSM) 98, written by Henry Kissinger about Israeli arms requests in the year 1970. 
Although the document is still classified, there exist several reviews of the NSSM 98 amongst 
the archival materials that are of importance and could contribute to uncovering the original 
contents of the NSSM 98.
47
 The high-quality digitised document series Foreign Relations of 
                                                 
46
 Logevall, Fredrik and Preston, Andrew eds. 2008. Nixon in the World. American Foreign Relations, 1969-
1977. New York: Oxford University Press, Inc.; Kochavi, Noam 2009. Nixon and Israel. Forging a 
Conservative Partnership. Albany: State University of New York Press; Hanhimäki, Jussi 2004. The Flawed 
Architect. Henry Kissinger and American Foreign Policy. New York: Oxford University Press, Inc. 
47
 See Chapter 3, «Army capabilities» 
13 
 
the United States (FRUS), compiled by the State Department, is also of high value, especially 
while writing about the period after the October War in 1973.
48
 
It must be noted that primary sources from the U.S. archives consist mostly of memoranda, 
conversations between the heads of states, telegrams, drafts, telephone conversations, and so 
on. It is essential to remember that some of these documents could be biased, and not 
reflecting an objective reality. This also applies to secondary sources. Furthermore, one 
should keep in mind that it was not always the person who is stated as the writer or legislator 
of the source who actually sent them out. Therefore, to avoid making any mistakes, the 
person’s name signed on the source is only used in this study when there is a strong indication 
that the person actually wrote it or was involved in the making of the document. It is also 
difficult to know if the text was read by anyone, or what impact this might have had. 
Conversely, the document can represent the different views and attitudes of the multiple 
policymakers in the Nixon Administration, and make the source a valuable comparison to 
other documents from this era. 
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2 The U.S. and Israel, 1948-1969 – A 
Flourishing Relationship 
 
For Israel was not created in order to disappear – Israel will endure and flourish. It is the child 
of hope and the home of the brave. It can neither be broken by adversity nor demoralized by 
success. It carries the shield of democracy and it honors the sword of freedom; and no area of 
the world has ever had overabundance of democracy and freedom – John F. Kennedy, 196049 
 
During the Cold War, the dominant focus of the United States was its conflict with the Soviet 
Union, to ensure its access to Middle Eastern oil, and to stop the spread of communism 
throughout the world. To achieve its goals, the United States wanted, and needed, 
strategically placed and loyal allies in the Middle East. In the 1960s and 1970s, the Middle 
Eastern oil reservoir made up two-thirds of the world’s known oil reserves. This made the 
region very important to the Washington policymakers, especially in the 1970s.
50
 After the 
first Arab-Israeli War in 1948 and the Suez Crisis in 1956, the Middle East seemed relatively 
stable. It was a stalemate, with no resolution to the conflict that was created after the 
formation of Israel in 1948.
51
 It was not until the Six-Day War in 1967 that the world began to 
understand that the Arab countries’ frustration over the territories occupied by Israel in the 
previous wars would only continue to grow unless there was a solution to the conflict. 
Between 1948 and 1969, Washington believed that the United States was the only nation in 
the world that could successfully prevent the Soviet Union from extending its influence in the 
Middle East.
52
 The American ambassador in charge of U.S. missions to the Near East, Edwin 
Allan Locke Jr. (1951-1952), believed that the American government was a good example for 
other countries, even the entire world, on how the different governments should practice their 
politics and run their nations. Locke anticipated that the countries who followed the American 
example would manage to obtain self-sustained growth and political stability. This was 
particularly aimed towards the countries in the Middle East, and one of the reasons why this 
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area became so important to the United States. The U.S. wanted to be the country with the 
utmost diplomatic power, and to dampen the Soviet Union’s influence.53  
In the making of Israel’s foreign and defence policies, the Cold War played a role in forming 
its relationship with the United States. Israel used the United States’ fear of communism to 
bring the two countries closer. It was communism against democracy. The majority of the 
Arab states were not yet affected by the Soviet Union but Washington was still worried that 
this might happen in the near future.
54
 The reason for this was the Arab countries and their 
relationship with former colonial masters in Western Europe, specifically Great Britain and 
France. Decolonialisation in Asia and the Middle East throughout the 1940s resulted in hostile 
feelings towards these powers, and these did not improve when the voting in the United 
Nations (UN), favouring the Partition Plan for Palestine (UN 181), established a Jewish 
national home in the former British Mandate Palestine. The partition of Palestine ended in the 
first Arab-Israeli war, in May 1948.
55
 The Israelis gained many enemies during this war, and 
were in desperate need of financial and military support.  
 
American foreign policy during the Truman administration (1945-1953) 
In May 1942, at the Biltmore Hotel in New York, an extraordinary Zionist Congress decided 
to open for Jewish immigration to Palestine. The Jewish Agency, the largest non-profit 
organisation in the world at that time and the Palestinian Jews’ semi-official government, 
should have had control of the immigration and the rebuilding of the country.
56
 Palestine was 
going to be a Jewish state, but the borders were not defined. When the United States and 
Europe became fully aware of the Holocaust, Americans and Europeans gave their support to 
the idea of a Jewish state.
57
 
Harry S. Truman (1945-53) had barely been President a week when he received the first 
appeal from the Zionist lobbies in the United States to support a new Jewish state in Palestine. 
The Zionists were supported by millions of Americans who wanted to condemn Hitler’s 
actions against the European Jews during World War II. This could not be ignored by the 
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President. Truman had little experience in the making of foreign policy, and the President 
decided to stand by the Balfour Declaration and its promise of a new Jewish homeland in 
Palestine.
58
 
Like any American president, Truman was under a tremendous amount of pressure from the 
Zionist lobbies. He understood that if he wanted to stay in office he had to keep the voters 
happy, and that included the American Jewish population that supported the creation of a 
Jewish national home and other interest groups that promoted the Jewish cause.
59
 In 1945, the 
American Congress supported free immigration for the European Jews to Palestine. The State 
Department, however, were not as enthusiastic about the creation of Israel. The department 
was shocked over what was going on in Palestine, with Jewish terrorist attacks against both 
the Palestinian public and British envoys. The State Department believed that the United 
States should stay out of the Middle East, as it saw the region as a source of serious conflicts 
both then and in the future. Truman was not against the State Department’s views and its 
concerns about what the formation of a Jewish national home would do to the Middle East, 
but the President had to consider both options.
 60
 
Truman had several pro-Zionist advisers in his administration, who were also some of his 
closest friends. They had a strong impact on the President’s decisions, and managed to 
persuade Truman that he was doing the right thing by supporting a new Jewish state.
61
 The 
Zionist lobbying groups had grown in strength and numbers in the period leading up to 1948. 
These groups combined had around one million members in the United States alone. The 
lobby did everything it could to push the Truman administration closer to a decision of 
supporting a Jewish national home, with letters, money contributions, and lobbying. In 1945, 
“thirty-three state legislatures, representing 85 per cent of the U.S. population, passed 
resolutions favouring establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine.”62 At a meeting in Potsdam 
in July, Truman received a cable from “thirty-seven governors… generated by the Zionists, 
urging that he demand that Britain lift the limits on Jewish immigration to Palestine. Over half 
the Congress also signed a message to this effect.”63 It was not an easy task for the President 
to take into accounts the State Department’s and the Congress’ differing views on foreign 
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policy issues. In 1948, the State Department favoured a U.N. trusteeship over Palestine, not a 
partition. They believed that by supporting a partition of Palestine, as the Congress did, this 
would threaten American interests in the Middle East, and increase Soviet influence in the 
area.
64
 
Truman had changed his mind several times regarding the United States’ approach to the 
possible creation of a Jewish state. The President was reluctant to do anything because of the 
pressure from the State Department to not support a partition plan. The Zionists were furious 
with Truman for not backing the partition fully.
65
 The presidential elections were coming up 
in November 1948 and Truman had to satisfy the Jewish voters, as well as the rest of the 
American population. He did just that, and on 14 May 1948, Israel’s first Prime- and Defence 
minister David Ben-Gurion announced the establishment of Israel. Eleven minutes later, the 
United States recognised the new Jewish state, with the Soviets right behind, recognising 
Israel a few days later.
66
 
 
Dwight D. Eisenhower and U.S. foreign policy during the 1950s 
President Dwight D. Eisenhower (1953-1961) was more conscious of the benefits of having 
closer ties with the Arab states in the Middle East than Truman. Eisenhower “acknowledged 
that he knew little about the Jewish people, having always thought of them as characters that 
only existed in the Bible.” He believed that “the Jews were in a category of extinct species.”67 
Eisenhower did not believe that he had to pay as much attention to domestic pressures from 
the Israeli lobbying groups as Truman had done. In response to the Suez War in 1956, which 
Eisenhower opposed, he stated that “[t]he welfare and best interest of our country were to be 
the sole criteria on which we operated.”68 No country or people would change his policies. He 
proved this by being the only president “to exert heavy pressure on the Jewish state for 
territorial withdrawal” from the territories Israel had seized from Egypt during the 1956 Suez 
War.
69
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In the early 1950s, U.S. policy on arms sales to the region was to restrict weapon sales to both 
Arab countries and Israel. Despite the United States’ restrictions, numerous weapons, 
including aircrafts, were illegally smuggled into Israel by American supporters.
70
 Israel had 
not aligned itself with either of the two superpowers so far, but both the Soviet Union and the 
United States had resources Israel wanted. The Soviet Union had the people, in terms of a 
large Jewish minority that was to become the core issue of the Jackson-Vanik Amendment in 
the 1970s, and they had the weapons.
71
 The United States had weapons and money. For that 
reason, Israel’s solution was to adopt a policy of “non-identification”, to have the opportunity 
of operating with both countries.
72
 Israel’s strategy lasted until the beginning of the Korean 
War (1950-1953), when Israel sided with the United States and began to look to Washington 
as a source of obtaining arms. Unfortunately for Israel, this was after the Tripartite 
Declaration was formed.
73
  
After the first Arab-Israeli War in 1948-1949, the United States, France, and Great Britain 
formed an arms embargo against the countries in the Middle East known as the Tripartite 
Declaration. The declaration was implemented in 1951 and defined the countries’ 
commitment to peace and stability in the region and their opposition to the use or threat of 
force.
74
 Eisenhower saw the declaration as an instrument to ensure neutrality of the West and 
the United States in the Arab-Israeli feud.
75
 However, “[t]he declaration included significant 
loopholes, including the recognition that all states ‘need to maintain a certain level of armed 
forces to assure their internal security and their legitimate self-defense.’ The appropriate level 
of each state was open to interpretation, and this was exploited by both suppliers and 
recipients."
76
 Not long after the declaration was created, France secretly broke the treaty, 
“seeing Israel as a natural ally against Arab nationalists opposing its claim to Algeria”, and 
began making secret arms sales to the Jewish state. By 1955 French weapon sales to Israel 
included aircrafts, heavy artillery and tanks. While Israel received weapons from France, the 
U.S. continued its arms embargo for the next seven years
 77
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Israel’s search for allies 
The level of financial and military aid for the state of Israel has varied between the different 
American Presidents from 1948 to 1969, but one president stands out, and this was 
Eisenhower. Israel wanted a strong ally, and it wanted arms to defend itself against a possible 
Arab attack. Israel had many supporters in the United States, both Jewish and Christians, and 
needed as much financial support as possible during the initial stages of the nation-building 
process after 1948.
78
 Shimon Peres, Director General of the Ministry of Defence (1953-1959) 
in Israel, wanted to focus on France rather than the U.S. Peres did not believe that the 
Americans would supply arms to Israel in the quantities the country needed. But as long as 
the arms embargo continued, Jerusalem was willing to receive arms from anyone. France 
offered it to them, in the hope of inducing Israel into going to war against Egypt in 1956. The 
U.S., in contrast, would only allow its allies to supply arms to Israel on the condition that 
Israel did not go to war. Israel could not promise this.
79
 
Israel’s first Prime- and Defence Minister was David Ben-Gurion. He held this position until 
his retirement in 1963, except for a brief period between 1954 and 1955. Ben-Gurion was an 
important figure in the making of the Jewish state and in the Israeli government as the leader 
of Mapai, one of the biggest Zionist movements in the Palestinian Mandate and the largest 
party in Israel until 1970.
80
 Unlike Peres, Ben-Gurion worked on persuading the United States 
to issue a formal statement saying that the U.S. would come to Israel’s defence against a 
Soviet, or a Soviet-backed attack, if such a situation should arise. Ben-Gurion explained,  
[w]hen we are isolated, the Arabs think that we can be destroyed and the Soviet exploits this 
card. If a great power stood behind us, and the Arabs knew that we are a fact that cannot be 
altered – Russia would cease its hostility toward us, because this hostility would no longer buy 
the heart of the Arabs.
81
  
Despite of the Israelis’ efforts in the 1950s, they could not get Eisenhower’s full support. The 
President’s stance remained unchanged. 
As a result of the United States’ lack of commitment towards Israel, the Israeli government 
needed to find other reliable allies. France was still selling military equipment to Israel after 
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the Suez War in 1956, but Ben-Gurion did not trust the French government to not change its 
policies because of pressure from the Arab countries. Therefore, he turned his attention 
toward West Germany. Israel had already received financial aid from the Federal Republic of 
Germany since 1952, but the Israeli government only asked the Germans in fear that the 
French alliance would end.
82
 Equipment and financial aid was not all the Israelis wanted 
when in the late 1950s, Israel began to develop a nuclear capacity.  
 
Israel’s nuclear history and the United States 
Israel’s nuclear project was initiated during an era when the country’s leader still had the 
authority and the means to initiate a nuclear venture on his own.
83
 Because of Ben-Gurion’s 
influence and power as the Israeli Prime Minister, he was allowed maximum political 
flexibility and deniability. He believed that nuclear weapons would be the ultimate answer to 
Israel’s security needs. As he saw it, Israel was surrounded by enemies and wanted to have 
the best possible means for a good military defence.
84
 
Israel was the sixth state in the world to develop nuclear weapons. The Israelis have never 
openly acknowledged their nuclear status, but had secretly begun to acquire a nuclear arsenal 
in the late 1950s. The United States could not be completely sure whether or not Israel had a 
nuclear capability, at least not before the U.S. took oversight pictures of the nuclear reactor 
Dimona, a 24 000 kilowatt nuclear facility, in the 1960s. Israel claimed that Dimona was 
dedicated to peaceful research and that no weapons were being produced there. The Israeli 
government assured the U.S. that they only wanted the ability and the resources to make such 
weapons if the Arabs were beginning to build their own. Washington accepted this, but had 
strong suspicions of a major Israeli nuclear weapons program.
85
. This is called nuclear opacity 
– “a situation in which a state’s nuclear capability has not been acknowledged, but is 
recognised in a way that influences other nations’ perceptions and actions.”86 The American 
acceptance allowed the Israelis to work on their nuclear arsenal without any disturbance. 
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Moshe Dayan, the Chief of Staff of the Israel Defence Force (IDF) (1953-1958), and Defence 
Minister during the Six-Day War in 1967, has stated that Israel “would not be saved by others 
simply because it was a Jewish state with such a history of suffering behind it. To ensure its 
security and survival, the Jewish state should assume the posture of a ‘detonator’ or ‘biting 
beast.’ Anyone in the world, including the great powers, should know that if they attempt to 
disregard Israeli interests, there would be such an explosion that their own interests would 
also be damaged.”87 Dayan advocated an Israeli self-reliance, and so did Ben-Gurion.  
The Israeli Prime Minister began his nuclear undertakings in secret in 1959, without 
conveying his plans onward before the Knesset or the cabinet, which were responsible for the 
actions of the government. Ben-Gurion only shared his plans with his closest colleague’s in 
Mapai. Golda Meir, the Israeli Prime Minister during the Nixon administration in the 1970s, 
was one of those colleagues, and wanted Dimona to be a reality. Golda Meir and Abba Eban, 
the Minister without Portfolio (1959-1960) and later the Israeli Minister of Foreign Affairs 
(1966-1974), wanted to signal to the Americans that Israel was on the verge of becoming a 
nuclear power. “The idea was to signal to the Americans that Israel might be driven to go 
down the path of nuclear deterrence unless America agreed to supply Israel with advanced 
weapons in sufficient quantities to sustain the conventional balance of power between it and 
its Arab neighbors.”88 This was something the Israelis and the Nixon administration believed 
could be a possibility during the October War in 1973, when Israel was losing ground to 
Egypt and Syria. Since Golda Meir was the Prime Minister of Israel at that time, her attitude 
towards Israel’s possible use of nuclear weapons, if threatened, was brought with her.89  
In 1955, the Eisenhower administration had offered Israel assistance in their nuclear research 
program. Eisenhower wanted this research to be done under the Atoms for Peace program, 
and Israeli scientists were trained in the United States to operate a nuclear reactor. The United 
States did not intend it to be as big as Dimona or a facility for developing nuclear weapons. In 
a speech in the UN National Assembly on 8 December 1953, Eisenhower stated that, 
The… important responsibility of this Atomic Energy Agency would be to devise methods… to 
serve the peaceful pursuits of mankind. Experts would be mobilized to apply atomic energy to 
the needs of agriculture, medicine, and other peaceful activities. A special purpose would be to 
provide abundant electrical energy in the power-starved areas of the world. Thus the 
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contributing powers would be dedicating some of their strength to serve the need rather than the 
fears of the world.
90
 
The administration was afraid of the growing nuclear capability of the Soviet Union, and 
failed to confront Israel with its nuclear program. The U.S. focused more on France, Great 
Britain, and the Soviets, and whether these countries were in possession of, or in the making 
of, nuclear weapons. The United States placed Israel in the “third category priority” list, a list 
with countries they did not consider a production risk.
91
 Even though these countries possibly 
were in the possession of nuclear weapons themselves, the United States did not want this to 
be something every country should have. The great powers had a feeling of what was going 
on in Israel, but they had no concrete evidence of Israel’s nuclear arsenal. Professor of Non-
proliferation Studies and author, Avner Cohen, argues that Israel’s nuclear opacity is “the 
worst kept secret in the world”, and this may be true.92  
 
The Kennedy and Johnson administrations and the first arms sales to Israel, 
1961-1969 
In February 1960, Eisenhower declared that the United States had no intention of becoming a 
major supplier of arms to the Middle East.
93
 Already in 1962, President John F. Kennedy 
(1961-1963) breached this policy of non-alignment when Israel seemed to be falling behind in 
the Middle East arms race. Soviet weaponry flooded into the Arab states, something that 
worried the U.S. Because of this, the American president approved an Israeli request for 
HAWK surface-to-air missiles, which had been waiting to be cleared since the Eisenhower 
Administration.
94
 The United States had now opened up for the sale of both defensive and 
offensive weapons to Israel for the first time in U.S. history. The United States did not want to 
pressure or provoke Israel by not provide armaments, and its failure to do anything about the 
Israeli government’s growing nuclear arsenal in the 1960s generated Arab mistrust towards 
                                                 
90
 Press release, “Atoms for Peace” speech, December 8, 1953. Source: National Archives, Eisenhower 
Presidential Materials, DDE’s Papers as President, Speech Series, Box 5, United Nations Speech, 12/8/53. 
Eisenhower archives, Atoms for Peace, Binder 13. 
http://www.eisenhower.archives.gov/research/online_documents/atoms_for_peace/Binder13.pdf  
91
 Barret 2007: 144 
92
Cohen 2012: 153 
93
 Neff 1995: 170 
94
 Eifram 1997: 162 
23 
 
Washington and pushed these states closer to the Soviet Union. Thus, the U.S. aligned itself 
with Israel without entering into a formal alliance.
95
 
The shift from Truman and Eisenhower’s foreign policies in regards to Israel, and over to 
Kennedy and the first American arms sale to Israel in 1962 was substantial. This shift in the 
making of foreign policy was a consequence of several strategic considerations. Firstly, the 
U.S. had a desire to balance Soviet arms sales to Egypt with its own to Israel. The reason 
behind this aspiration was the fear of increased Soviet influence in the region. Secondly, the 
Kennedy Administration also wished to dampen Israel’s nuclear ambitions, by supplying 
enough equipment to prevent Israel from possibly relying on its nuclear capability. And 
thirdly, the U.S. also wanted to encourage the Israeli government to respond favourably to 
U.S. initiatives.
96
   
John F. Kennedy was the first American president to call the connection with Israel a “special 
relationship.” He was also “the first president to appoint a full-time aide to maintain contact 
with the U.S.-Jewish community, thus giving Jewish leaders, Israeli embassy officials, and 
pro-Israeli congressmen immediate access to the White House, which they had been denied 
during the Eisenhower Years.”97 Although this may not explain the increased weapon sales to 
Israel since 1962, it did supply the opportunity for pro-Israeli policies to be discussed in 
Congress, thus making it harder for the President and future presidents to go against their 
wishes. Despite the United States’ desires to hide its increased aid to Israel, Israeli diplomacy, 
pro-Israeli advisers, and Kennedy’s desire to maintain support from the Jewish voters and 
donors had a big impact on his decisions.
98
  
President Kennedy was shot and killed in November 1963. He was succeeded by Vice 
President Lyndon B. Johnson (1963-1969). In 1965, Johnson continued the sale of military 
equipment to Israel, and sold 210 M-48 Paton tanks and 48 Skyhawk bombers to Jerusalem. 
These tanks were shipped from West Germany to Israel in order to disguise the United States’ 
involvement with Israel, in the hope of not suffering negative repercussions from the Arab 
states.
99
 In addition to the weapon supplies, the United States had provided modest financial 
aid to Israel after 1948. This amount increased during the Johnson Administration, from an 
                                                 
95
 Neff 1995: 173 
96
 Mearsheimer & Walt 2007: 24, Quandt 2005: 6 
97
 Christison 2001: 107 
98
 Mearsheimer & Walt: 25 
99
 Mearsheimer and Walt 2007: 25; Spiegel 1985: 106-110 
24 
 
average of around $63 million per year in the 1950s, to $102 million per year from 1966 to 
1970.
100
 As the support for Israel grew bigger within the bureaucracy, the economic 
assistance of the United States would only intensify in the years to come. 
After Ben-Gurion’s retirement in 1963, Levi Eshkol was elected as the new Mapai leader and 
Prime Minister of Israel (1963-1969). Eshkol had served as Minister of Agriculture and 
Development and as Minister of Finance in the former governments.
101
 Like Ben-Gurion, 
Eshkol adopted the defence portfolio in addition to the role of Prime Minister. As Minister of 
Defence, Eshkol steadily built up the Israeli Defence Force (IDF), giving priority to the 
armoured corps and the air force. In 1965, Ezer Weizman, the commander of the IDF, was 
sent to Washington with a long list of necessary weapons, which included a high number of 
Skyhawk bombers, as well as 45 A-6 Intruders; attack airplanes. This request was approved, 
and the weapons were delivered to Israel.
102
  
In May 1967, Johnson raised the U.S.-Israeli relationship to a new level. On 14 May 1967, 
Egypt’s President Nasser sent Egyptian troops into the Sinai Peninsula and demanded that the 
U.N. forces that had been stationed there leave. The U.N. forces had been stationed in Sinai 
since the Suez War in 1956. A week later, after midnight on 22-23 May, Nasser blocked the 
Strait of Tiran and the opening of the Gulf Aqaba, thus hindering Israel’s access to the port at 
Eilat; the only Israeli port on the Red Sea. Johnson’s primary concern at this time was not to 
relieve the threat against Israel, but to avoid involving the United States. The U.S. was deeply 
involved in the Vietnam War, and was not willing to get into a confrontation that might 
involve the Soviet Union.
103
 This was one of the incidents leading to the outbreak of the Six-
Day War in 1967, when, in the aftermath of the conflict, the United States radically changed 
its policies toward Israel.
104
 
 
 
 
                                                 
100
 Mearsheimer and Walt 2007: 26  
101
 Shlaim 2000: 218 
102
 Shlaim 2000: 218-219 
103
 Christison 2001: 111; Quandt 2005: 24-25 
104
 Ibid 
25 
 
The U.S. and the Six-Day War, 1967 
Throughout the period leading up to the war in 1967, three incidents can explain Israel’s 
requests for more military supplies. The first incident occurred in January 1964, when the 
Arab League gathered for a summit meeting in Cairo.
105
 The main item on its agenda was the 
threat posed by Israel’s plans for diversion of the Jordan River. Its plans were to divert water 
from the North of Jordan to irrigate the South. This would severely impact the available water 
supplies to Syria and Jordan, and these countries could not let this happen.
106
 The second 
incident was the growing tensions in the region after the Israeli raid on the Jordan village 
Samu in November 1966, and the Israeli-Syrian air battle in April 1967. This resulted in the 
IDF shooting down six Syrian MiGs.
107
 The Samu raid cost the lives of 3 Palestinian villagers 
with 96 injured, as well as the death of 15 Jordanian soldiers. Israel was strongly criticised for 
this incident by the Arab world, the U.N., and the United States. This situation arose as a 
consequence of several Palestinian guerrilla attacks inside Israeli territory between 1965 and 
1967, which was also the third reason for Israel’s requests for more military supplies. Jordan’s 
King Hussein tried to prevent the Palestinian guerrilla organization Fatah, led by Yasir Arafat, 
from launching attacks on Israel from inside Jordan territory, in the hope of continuing his 
improving relationship with the Israeli government.
108
 
By 1967, Johnson’s primary concern was the war in Vietnam. This preoccupation made him 
leave the Middle East foreign policy issues to the State Department. The department was 
concerned about the negative development in the region, with increased tensions surrounding 
the Israeli-Syrian borders. As the situation in the Middle East intensified, one might have 
suspected that the United States would take a strong position in support of Israel. On the 
contrary, the Johnson administration was reluctant to intervene. Johnson wanted to avoid 
another war at any costs, and tried to restrain the Israelis from attacking Egyptian forces near 
the borders.
109
  
After Egypt had closed the strait of Tiran and the Gulf of Aquba in May 1967, the United 
States was afraid of what Israel might do. On 25 May, Israel’s Foreign Minister Abba Eban 
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visited Washington, requesting more military assistance. Eban also wanted to get a firm 
commitment from the U.S. on supporting Israel if an Arab attack proved accurate.
110
 The 
Israeli Foreign Minister informed the United States of an impending Egyptian attack on Israel. 
He “was instructed to inform the highest authority of this new threat to peace and to request 
an official statement from the United States that an attack on Israel would be viewed as an 
attack on the United States.”111 Johnson was not willing to issue such a statement, but was 
willing to grant $70 million worth of military equipment. The President wanted to avert Israel 
from resorting to the use of force against Egypt’s blockade of the strait.112 On 26 May, the 
President summoned the National Security Council for a meeting in the White House. There, 
he asked American intelligence experts to assess the situation in the Middle East. They 
concluded that an Arab attack was not imminent, and that Israel was in fact capable of 
sustaining a simultaneous attack from multiple Arab states.
 113 
 
On 28 May 1967, Moscow told President Johnson that they had information about Israel and 
its plans to attack. The Soviets told Johnson that “if Israel starts military action, the Soviet 
Union would extend help to the attacked states.”114 The President warned Israel about the 
message from the Soviets, and urged the Israelis not to pre-empt an attack on Egypt. The 
Israelis took this advice into consideration, but continued to pressure Johnson to make a 
formal commitment, urging him to use all his influence in trying to revoke the blockade of the 
strait. The Israelis wanted support from the United States, but were afraid they might lose the 
American backing if they should strike first. Conversely, that was exactly what Israel did, and 
the war broke out on 5 June.
115
  
The Six-Day War was the greatest victory in Israel’s history. It ended on 10 June 1967, with 
Israel in occupation of the Golan Heights, Gaza, Sinai, the old city of Jerusalem, and the West 
Bank. Throughout this war, Israel had no clear plan or guidelines for the army on how far to 
go. The Israeli government just followed the path the war took, and exploited the 
opportunities it gave.
116
 Israel had proven to be the stronger power in the Middle East, and 
this boosted its self-confidence. If Israel wanted to continue its superiority it had to get the 
best possible military defence, and wanted the help in achieving this goal from the United 
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States. Before the Israelis could begin planning their new arms request, the parties involved in 
the conflict had to achieve some form of resolution.
117
  
 
The formation of U.N. Resolution 242 - 1967 
The United States and the Soviet Union worked together on forming a U.N. Security Council 
Resolution that would benefit all parties involved in the conflict after the war had ended. This 
was not an easy task but in November 1967, Great Britain took charge, and the passing of 
U.N. Resolution 242 became a fact.
118
 The resolution called for “withdrawal of Israeli armed 
forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict” and “termination of all claims of 
belligerency and respect for an acknowledgement of the sovereignty, territorial integrity, and 
political independence of every state in the area and their right to live in peace within secure 
and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force.”119 The U.N. Resolution 242 did 
not specify which territories Israel had to withdraw from, if it was all the territory Israel had 
occupied in the recent conflict or some of it. Israel did not want to withdraw from any 
territories unless the Arab states ended the hostilities and agreed to full peace. The resolution 
would become the source of the diplomatic difficulties in achieving a permanent peace-
agreement in the region in the years to come, and was to become the future of U.S. policy 
towards the Middle East.
120
 
In January 1968, Israeli Prime Minister Eshkol met with Johnson to discuss the new military 
arms requests. On top of the list were high-performance F-4 Phantom jets. Johnson was 
willing to assure that the Phantoms would be provided, but did not specify the terms, timing 
or the conditions.
121
 After much deliberation within the bureaucracy, Johnson decided, on 9 
October 1968, that the United States and Israel would sign the deal for 50 F-4 Phantoms in 
December that year, with the first deliveries of aircrafts to Israel in 1969, and the rest in 
1970.
122
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American policymaking concerning the Middle East during this period was not easy, and the 
different administrations’ decisions were rarely seen in simple pro-Israeli or pro-Arab terms. 
The American policymakers did not make any swift decisions, and did not want to be dragged 
into another big conflict. Their goal was to keep the region stable, and achieve peace between 
the Arab states and Israel. If the administration could make this happen it was thought that 
this would halt the Soviet influence in the Middle East and increase Israel’s security, while 
improving U.S. relations with the Arab countries.
123
 Despite their goals, peace was not yet 
achieved when Lyndon B. Johnson ended his bid for re-election in November 1968. He was 
succeeded by another man that might adopt a different policy, and that was Richard M. 
Nixon. 
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3 The American Arms Sales to Israel, 
1969-1971 
 
Where peace is unknown, make it welcome; where peace is fragile, make it strong; where peace 
is temporary, make it permanent… After a period of confrontation, we are entering an era of 
negotiation. Let all nations know that during this administration our lines of communication 
will be open… We cannot expect to make everyone our friend, but we can try to make no one 
our enemy.
124
 
 
When President Richard Milhous Nixon took office in January 1969, there were a lot of 
questions to be answered and a lot of options regarding Israel and the Middle East to be 
considered. The former president Johnson had already signed off on an Israeli arms request 
for 50 F-4 Phantom jet fighter aircrafts that were to be delivered between 1969 and 1970. 
Nixon had intended to pursue an impartial policy toward the Arab-Israeli conflict, and was 
not certain if selling military equipment to Israel was the best decision at this point in time. 
Nixon’s reservations were short-lived, when in October 1970, the U.S. agreed to a SAM-
equipment package. This package contained some of the U.S.’ most sophisticated weapons 
that were delivered to Israel after the Jordan Civil War in September 1970. From 1970 to 
1971 there was a remarkable increase in the quantities of military and financial aid that were 
either given or sold to Israel. President Nixon and Henry Kissinger stood by these actions and 
deemed them necessary for Israel’s immediate and future safety.125  
Throughout the first three years of Nixon’s presidency, Middle Eastern policymaking in the 
American government was dominated by sharp tensions between the Nixon-Kissinger 
globalist strategy, which was centred on defeating the Soviet Union, and a regionalist strategy 
pursued by the State Department under Secretary of State William P. Rogers (1969-1973). 
The regionalist approach viewed the events that took place in the Middle East as driven 
primarily by local factors, not inspired by the Soviet Union.
126
 The State Department regarded 
Israel’s inflexibility and lack of cooperation in the region, with consideration to the occupied 
territories and the Palestinian refugees, as the root cause of Soviet gains in the Middle East. 
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The Nixon Administration, in the State Department’s opinion, had to halt the Soviet influence 
by extorting pressure on Israel.
127
 In retrospect, there was much to the regionalist approach, 
but Nixon and Kissinger were driven by a deep fear of communist infiltration and its spread 
throughout the world. In Kissinger’s first years in office as National Security Advisor, he 
promoted that the United States should avoid any serious efforts to resolve the Arab-Israeli 
conflict. As he saw it, the stalemate was in the United States’ best interest because this would 
frustrate the radical Arabs and the Soviet Union. Initially, Nixon agreed with the State 
Department’s view that Israel’s rigidness concerning the withdrawal from its occupied 
territories was an important cause for the tensions in the area.
128
  
Within the State Department, professionals tended to agree that the situation in the Middle 
East was dangerous and unstable. Their perceptions were affected by the possible threats to 
American interests arising from the Arab states’ frustration over the U.S. foreign policy-
decisions, Israel’s occupation of territories and the vast expulsion of Palestinians from Israel. 
The Arab states had therefore remained close to the Soviet Union after the war in 1967. Inside 
the American Government, the policymakers believed that the Middle East was divided in 
two camps, with the United States, Israel and the “moderate” Arabs in the one, and the Soviet 
Union and the “radical” Arabs in the other.129 The State Department had for a long time 
wanted to keep an unbiased approach to the Arab-Israeli conflict. This meant that they wanted 
a policy that was neither pro-Arab nor openly pro-Israeli. With regards to arms deliveries to 
Israel, this even-handed approach urged restraint and territorial withdrawal from the territories 
Israel had occupied during the 1967 War.
130
 
Since before the 1967 War the Israelis had not felt safe, as they believed that Israel was 
surrounded by enemies. Especially after the Arab summit meetings in the 1960s, this feeling 
grew even stronger. These summits had, in principle, stated the Arab countries’ wish for the 
final liquidation of Israel.
131
  But Israel had won the Six-Day War in 1967, and had proven its 
military might. The Israelis were in need of replacements for damaged military equipment, 
although this need was not abundant compared to the other Arab states. Once more, Israel had 
proven its superiority over the Arabs. Even without its lost equipment, Israel was still on top. 
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So why were the Israelis so desperate to continue their quest for more military equipment and 
financial aid?  
The U.S. was deeply involved in Vietnam, and had a strict governmental budget. Israel had, in 
fact, planned for 1970 a growth rate of 7.5 per cent and a low rate of unemployment- 
approximately 4 percent.
132
 On the one hand, the Israelis were doing well, yet they still 
wanted and felt they needed more. If the American Government did not provide what the 
Israelis deemed necessary, Israel would try to seek assistance elsewhere. On the other hand, if 
the U.S. sold military equipment to Israel, the Nixon Administration was afraid that this might 
increase the Middle Eastern arms race with weapons provided by the Soviet Union. There 
were a lot of questions to be considered and discussed.  
 
The first year in office, 1969-1970 
Nixon and Kissinger held similar views on the international role of the United States, “on the 
need for strength linked to diplomacy”, and on the close relations between domestic and 
foreign policy as well as the danger of nuclear war.
133
 One of the main Nixon and Kissinger 
strategies was détente. This strategy sought to improve U.S.-Soviet relations with arms 
limitation. The goal was to slow down the nuclear arms race that had increased since the late 
1940s, and to create a good climate for cooperation and mutual acceptance.
134
 In June 1970, 
the U.S. was concerned about increased Soviet activity in Cuba. Kissinger had received 
reports about the possibility that the Soviets were building a nuclear submarine base there, 
and this would have violated the solution reached after the Cuban missile crisis in 1962 
between the U.S. and the Soviet Union. No such base was detected, however, and Washington 
was assured that no nuclear weapons would be placed so close to the United States.
135
 Nixon 
did stress the different circumstances his administration was placed under compared to 
Kennedy, 
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We also have had to consider that we are conducting foreign policy under extremely difficult 
circumstances. We did not invent the new strategic balance. We inherited a changed strategic 
relationship. Whereas the Kennedy administration dealt with the Soviet Union when the Soviets 
had 80 ICBM [Intercontinental ballistic missiles] that were liquid fuelled and took ten minutes 
to prepare, we face over 1,000 ICBM’s that can be fired immediately.136 
Another foreign policy strategy of the Nixon administration was linkage. Nixon believed that 
since the world had become more interconnected in the years leading up to the 1970s, all 
matter of foreign policy was linked to everything else, “from nuclear weapons to European 
communism, from relations with China to domestic politics, and from the Vietnam War to 
Latin America and the Middle East.” Nixon and Kissinger sought to link together solutions to 
different crises, to find the best possible answers on how to handle them.
137
  
The Nixon administration was also credited for creating the landmark Anti-Ballistic Missile 
Treaty (ABM), the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT) negotiated with the Soviet 
Union and signed in 1972, and the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT).
138
 These treaties 
were given great importance as a stabilising factor in the United States’ and the Soviet 
Union’s power struggle. SALT was designed to limit the production and deployment of 
strategic weapons. The treaties got positive feedback from arms control advocates as “the 
cornerstone of strategic stability, formally recognising that nuclear weapons offered no 
military and scant political utility in a world of superpower parity and mutually assured 
destruction.”139  
Despite the formation of these treaties, Nixon and Kissinger did not share the view of the 
arms control community, nor did they share the enthusiasm of the previous administrations 
for limiting the spread of nuclear weapons. They believed that the spread of such weapons 
was inevitable and not something the United States should oppose.
140
 Neither Nixon nor 
Kissinger saw the nuclear arms race as the cause, or key factor, in the Cold War conflict. 
They believed that “more states with nuclear weapons were not only inevitable, but also 
potentially desirable.”141 The President and his National Security Advisor believed that 
political tensions were the reason for wars, not an increased arms race. Nixon and Kissinger’s 
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nuclear strategy was what Nixon called his “madman” strategy. The idea of this strategy, 
“was to convey the impression that the administration was willing, in a crisis, to use 
‘excessive force’, and to threaten, often implicitly, that nuclear weapons might be used”.142  
Israel had already started their road to a nuclear arsenal in the late 1950s, and since 1965, the 
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) suspected that Israel had stolen around 100 kilograms of 
weapons-grade uranium from the Apollo plant of Nuclear Materials and Equipment 
Cooperation (NUMEC) in Pennsylvania. NUMEC was one of the principal processors of 
nuclear materials in the United States, and several of its employees had close contacts with 
Israeli officials. Investigations were conducted by the CIA in 1969, but these were closed 
after a short time due to lack of evidence.
143
 Kissinger did not have any grave concerns about 
the reports of the Israelis stealing uranium in 1969, and not long after this incident was 
known, the United States ended pressuring Israel to get rid of its nuclear arsenal.
144
 Nixon and 
Kissinger both believed that Israel would never get rid of its nuclear capability, and that it did 
not really matter if it did. This policy change also emerged after an unrecorded and 
undocumented meeting between Nixon and Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir. The meeting 
led to a secret, mutual understanding on Israel’s nuclear weapons program. The contents of 
this meeting are still unrevealed. However, the outcome was that the United States ended 
pressuring Israel for answers about its nuclear program 
145
  
 
Priority areas 
Even though tensions were also high in the Middle East in the years following the 1967 War, 
the war in Vietnam was at the top of Nixon’s agenda regarding foreign policy issues. The war 
had lasted since 1957, but it was not until 1963 that the United States’ army had fought 
together with South Vietnam. The majority of the American public was tired of the war and 
wanted it to come to an end, together with bringing American troops home. The war was a 
grave concern for the American presidents dealing with it, and the Tet offensive in Vietnam in 
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February 1968 was one of the reasons why the former President Lyndon B. Johnson decided 
not to run for re-election.
146
 Apart from the Vietnam War, Nixon and Kissinger were 
primarily concerned with ending the Cold War rivalries between themselves and the Soviet 
Union. They wanted to protect American interests in the region, and to become the dominant 
power in the Middle East.
147
 
Nixon was unusual among the 20
th
 century presidents in terms of his enthusiasm for foreign 
policy. He believed that it was the President’s responsibility to conduct foreign policy, 
leaving the domestic policymaking to the Cabinet. The President was “conscious of the 
constraints on his freedom to act, especially by the Congress and public opinion, and was 
determined to take an active role in the conduct of diplomacy.”148 Nixon and Kissinger had 
revitalised the National Security Council (NSC). “Distrusting the professional diplomats of 
the State Department and determined to control foreign policy from the White House, they 
resurrected the machinery of government to place the National Security Council in charge of 
decision making and put Kissinger in control of the NSC.”149 Vietnam, the Soviet Union and 
China came to be linked as priority concerns to the Nixon administration and the NSC. 
Significantly, each was managed almost exclusively from the White House, with the President 
providing general guidance and Kissinger and his staff working on the details of the new 
policies and overseeing their implementation. One priority area was handed to the State 
Department, and this was the Middle East, at least for the time being.
150
 Kissinger would 
gradually take over the policies regarding the Middle East from the early 1970s.  
 
Israel and the United States, 1969-1970 
For the American Government, it was important to understand what Israel really wanted in 
terms of its objectives of foreign policy decisions. The United States needed to analyse these 
objectives and decisions in order to make sure they were consistent with the government’s 
own aims and interests in the region. These interests were mainly the Soviet Union, and to 
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maintain Israel’s military superiority over the surrounding Arab countries. The United States 
and Israel wanted to keep the Israeli forces able to defeat any Arab state by keeping a constant 
ratio between the number of Arab and Israeli aircrafts in Israel’s favour. It was also important 
to supervise the availability of fully trained Arab pilots, so they would not exceed the Israelis’ 
capabilities.
151
  
On 1 February, 1969, the National Security Council (NSC) met to review the policy for the 
Middle East. Three alternatives, each discussed in National Security Study Memoranda 
(NSSM) 2, were considered. The first alternative was to let the forces play themselves out. 
The United States thought that Egypt was not ready for a settlement because it wanted the 
return of the territories of Sinai that Israel had occupied in the recent conflict. If the Egyptians 
managed to get this territory back, it would have decreased Israel’s security. The U.S. would 
not let that happen. On the other hand, Israel was the strongest military power in the Middle 
East, and when Egypt’s President Nasser would come to understand that he would not be able 
to defeat Israel on his own, the United States believed that Nasser might be ready for a 
settlement.
152
 
The second alternative was to actively seek an overall settlement, to achieve peace in the 
region. This was one of the United States’ main goals, but it was challenging to achieve. The 
situation in the region was degenerating, and the Arab Fedayeen’s power was increasing. 
None of the parties involved in the Arab-Israeli conflict were willing to secede to the other 
parties’ demands, especially Israel. This was related to the third alternative, to actively seek to 
limit the dangers in the absence of a settlement. The Israelis were moving towards a nuclear 
capacity, and if the Arab countries knew about this, a settlement would be less likely as the 
Soviets would find it even harder to stay out of another military conflict.
153
 
With so many options to be considered and decided upon, what should the American Middle 
Eastern policy have been? Henry Kissinger was very concerned with shielding Israel from the 
pressure to withdraw from all, or most of the territory it had occupied in the 1967-war. Much 
of that pressure came from the State Department, which promoted a settlement that involved 
Israel’s withdrawal from nearly all of the occupied territories from the previous wars. 
Kissinger strongly opposed this policy on the grounds that it would reward the United States’ 
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Cold War opponents and strain the U.S.-Israeli relationship, as well as decrease Israel’s 
security.
 154
  
 
The Rogers Plan 
The conclusions from the NSC meeting on 1 February 1969, were to become the basis for the 
new Middle Eastern policy. In late 1969, Secretary of State William P. Rogers presented a 
formula for lasting peace in the Middle East. This would come to be known as the Rogers 
Plan. It called for Israeli withdrawal from territories it had occupied in the 1967 War. In 
exchange, the Arab states were to make peace with Israel and acknowledge its right to exist. 
The Rogers Plan, as Professor in U.S. Foreign Relations Salim Yaqub wrote, “also called for 
the demilitarisation of the Sinai Peninsula, safe passage of Israeli vessels through the Suez 
Canal and the Strait of Tiran, a negotiated settlement of Jerusalem’s status on the basis of 
shared Israeli and Jordanian administration, and a resolution of the Palestinian refugee issue 
through a combination of repatriation and resettlement.”155  
Kissinger strongly opposed this plan because he believed it would empower the Arab states 
and the Soviet Union, while weakening Israel. He wanted to delay any settlement until after 
the Arab countries had ended relations with the Soviet Union and shifted their focus toward 
the United States. Kissinger also knew that Israel would resist any attempt to let the occupied 
territories go. This, in turn, would cause difficulties for the American administration as it 
would cause strong reactions among the American Jewish population at home supportive of 
Israel, as well as other pro-Israeli advocates.
156
 
Nixon, on the other hand, was not as negative as Kissinger at first, but had sympathy for both 
Rogers’ and Kissinger’s views. The President soon realised that the American Jewish voters 
were an important political constituency which had to be taken into account if he was to have 
a chance of winning the up-coming presidential elections in 1972. Throughout his first term, 
Nixon sought to attract Jewish support. He could not get this by supporting the Rogers’ Plan 
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and the State Department.
157
 Nixon later wrote in his memoirs that, “I knew that the Rogers 
Plan could never be implemented, but I believed that it was important to let the Arab world 
know that the United States did not automatically dismiss its case regarding the occupied 
territories… With the Rogers Plan on the record, I thought it would be easier for the Arab 
leaders to propose reopening relations with the United States.”158 Nixon has been known for 
keeping things to himself, so when the President openly gave the impression that he supported 
the plan, he secretly instructed his adviser on Jewish affairs, one of several positions held 
during the Nixon Administration, Leonard Garment (1969-1974), to give private assurance to 
Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir and the Jewish leaders in America that the president had no 
intention of pursuing the Rogers Plan.
159
 Despite Nixon’s deliberate undermining of the 
Rogers’ Plan, he agreed with Rogers’ view that American policy, by implementing the plan, 
would not only point the way to a just solution in the Arab-Israeli conflict, but the U.S. would 
also continue its important alliance with the Western powers.
160
 
 
The War of Attrition 
…some argue that another war is unlikely as long as Israel retains superiority and does not feel 
threatened… If, on the other hand, Israel feels isolated and threatened, it could choose to attack 
the UAR in a final effort to topple Nasser or seize Lebanese or Jordanian territory in an effort to 
end Fedayeen shelling... So the way to stability is to keep Israel feeling strong and secure – U.S. 
options on Assistance to Israel, 1970.
161
 
The term “War of Attrition” has usually been applied to the Egyptian-Israeli clashes that took 
place between March 1969, and August 1970. The fighting occurred when the situation in the 
Middle East began to deteriorate due to Israel’s strengthening of the borders surrounding its 
occupied territories. Nasser did not want the Suez Canal to be the defining border between 
Egypt and Israel, and sought to push the Israeli forces back with attacks on the Israeli armies 
stationed in the area. Israel responded to these threats with commando raids, air control, and 
the building of 35 new fortifications along the Canal that was called the Bar Lev line.
162
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The United States also sought to get an Israeli acceptance of UN Resolution 242, but Israel 
was not willing to accept a resolution that called for Israeli withdrawal. Jerusalem wanted 
guarantees of arms deliveries from the U.S. before agreeing to discuss any diplomatic 
initiatives. From January to April 1970, American-made Israeli Phantom Jets were flying over 
Cairo releasing (8000 tons of) explosives.
163
 These clashes, in turn, were accompanied by 
Egyptian and Israeli demands for the latest weapon technology from their sponsors, the Soviet 
Union and the United States.  
Nasser went to Moscow requesting increased quantities of military equipment as well as 
Soviet combat personnel and technicians. The Egyptian President had agreed to begin 
working on a permanent peace agreement, and in return for his cooperation, the Soviets would 
send large quantities of sophisticated military equipment to Egypt. By mid-March, new and 
extensive emplacements of advanced SAM 3 surface-to-air missiles, guns, radar systems, and 
MiG fighter planes were operational. 15 000 Soviet technicians and advisors, including 200 
pilots were also in place.
164
 The Soviet Union had never before given such sophisticated 
military equipment to a non-communist country in such a short period of time.
165
 This 
equipment was superior in quality and quantity to those available to the Egyptians at the 
outbreak of the 1967 War, and significantly improved their defence force.
166
  
After several additional clashes between the IDF and the Egyptians, Secretary of State 
William Rogers issued a second proposal on 19 June, which was known as Rogers B, or the 
Second Rogers Plan. This plan had three parts. First, a three month cease-fire on the Egyptian 
front; second, a statement by Israel, Jordan and Egypt issuing the acceptance of Security 
Council Resolution 242, with emphasis on the withdrawal from occupied territories; and third, 
an undertaking from Israel to negotiate with Egypt and Jordan under Dr. Gunnar Jarring’s 
auspices as soon as a cease-fire went into effect.
167
  
After the 1967-War, the U.N. had appointed the Swedish Diplomat Dr. Gunnar Jarring to 
mediate in the Middle East and to get the parties involved in the Arab-Israeli conflict started 
on a possible peace settlement. Syria had declined to participate in the Jarring talks, but the 
other Arab states were optimistic. Israel, however, was sceptical, and had no expectations of a 
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good outcome.
168
 The Israelis did not believe in the U.N.’s ability to mediate, but did not want 
these talks to end because Israel might get blamed for their failure. Therefore, Israel continued 
to supply Dr. Jarring with new proposals and documents in order to keep the mission alive.
169
 
Golda Meir immediately wanted to reject the proposal from Rogers on 19 June 1970, seeing it 
as a means of imposing the original Rogers Plan. President Nixon advised Israel to not be the 
first to reject the plan, but as Egypt and Jordan accepted it, the Israelis were bound to comply. 
The War of Attrition had ended, and the Jarring talks begun once more.
170
  
By the end of July 1970, Israeli retaliatory raids had wiped out Egypt’s protective air defence 
missile systems as well as its heavy weapons. Prime Minister Golda Meir’s wish for Nasser’s 
destruction and resignation did not come true. Nasser’s regime did not fall under the Israeli 
raids, and the Soviet Union had physically intervened by sending their own technicians and 
personnel to help the Egyptians.
171
  
In September 1969, Israel had requested an additional 100 A-4 Skyhawks attack aircrafts and 
25 F-5 Phantom jet fighter-bombers from the United States. Nixon was reluctant to give the 
Israelis a positive response on their request, and in March 1970, Kissinger and Rogers made 
the decision to hold Israel’s requests for these aircrafts, awaiting further developments in the 
area. The aircrafts would be delivered, Kissinger assured Ambassador Dinitz, but this had to 
be executed during a time with less attention on the U.S. relationship with Israel.
172
  The 
Israeli government had expressed its concern about the absence of a distinct prospect of 
additional planes. The Meir government had stated that, 
[u]navoidably there begins to emerge a frightening picture of a state whose entire being is 
dependent on an air shield that is gradually shrinking, and of a stage in the not so distant future 
when the country will appear ready prey for its enemies…before this threat to our security 
becomes actively real there shall apparently be dealt us now a political blow by a decision 
which cannot but be interpreted as meaning that Israel is indeed alone and abandoned.
173
 
The Nixon administration had to reassure Israel that it was not alone, and that the U.S. would 
resume its deliveries to Israel in the near future. Washington knew that such statements from 
the Israelis would evoke strong protests from the American Israeli supporters, but was forced 
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to keep their plans quiet, in fear of strong Soviet reactions. Despite of their hesitations, the 
first F-5 Phantom jets reached Israel in September. These aircrafts soon became the Arab 
symbol of American support for Israel in the Middle East. Because of the increased Soviet 
involvement, Israel was more dependent on American strategic support and arms supplies 
than ever before.
174
 
By August 1970, the Israelis and Egyptians agreed to a cease-fire, but only after intense 
debates and rivalries within the Nixon administration.
175
 The Israelis only accepted the cease-
fire because of Nixon’s promise of border changes only as a result of negotiations. In 
addition, Nixon assured Israel that the country would get more military and financial help.
176
 
Before agreeing to a cease-fire, Prime Minister Golda Meir sought a guarantee that Israel 
would be allowed to purchase standoff anti-radiation missiles (SHRIKE) and Phantom jets, 
that the Rogers Plan would be withdrawn, and that the U.S. would veto any anti-Israeli 
resolutions in the United Nations. The United States agreed to the demands.
 177
 
 
Arms deliveries, 1970 
The Nixon administration was concerned about the consequences of openly supporting Israel 
with military equipment. If the U.S. were to take some distance from the Jewish state, how 
much could Washington take before they reached a dangerous situation? Israel had asked the 
U.S. for more military equipment, but there were a few points that needed to be considered if 
the United States was to make this happen. How would the Nixon Administration’s response 
to Israel’s assistance request affect the U.S.’ main interests in the Middle East? Would this 
worsen the American relationship with the Arabs? If so, how would this affect Israel’s 
survival? And could the United States still avoid a confrontation with the Soviet Union?
178
 
These were some of the questions raised by a National Security Council ad hoc group, created 
in October 1969. This group was to, instead of the Pentagon, discuss the United States’ 
policies with regards to Israel. The Department of Defence had other important foreign policy 
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issues to take care of, as well as a lack of a clear arms transfer policy. The question of raised 
military assistance to Israel was now up to the NSC ad hoc group to figure out.
179
 
In a summary for the NSC ad hoc group on Israel from 23 February 1970, Henry Kissinger 
wrote, “[a] number of Arab friends in Tunisia, Morocco, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and 
Jordan have told us that a decision to supply additional aircraft [to Israel] will virtually put an 
end to any diplomatic effort to achieve a political settlement on the basis of the U.S. peace 
proposals. If the U.S. in Arab eyes back Israel’s current strategy, the Arabs say they will not 
be able to regard U.S. peace proposals sincere.”180 This was critical. The United States needed 
a good diplomatic relationship with the Arab states. If the U.S. decided not to supply Israel 
with more armaments, the Nixon administration could risk losing its alliance with Israel. So, 
what was the United States to do?  
The answer was to deliver 44 Phantoms by the end of June 1970, and to sell and deliver 3 
additional Phantoms to Israel in July and the remaining 3 in August. This would bring the 
total up to 50, which was in compliance with the 1968 Phantom deal that the former President 
Johnson had approved. Only 88 Skyhawks of the 100 committed in past contracts had been 
delivered so far, and neither the Soviet Union nor the UAR would react badly to these 
deliveries.
181
 In addition, the Israelis regarded the American administration’s decision as a test 
of their support for Israel. This made it difficult to do nothing.  
In the same document, Henry Kissinger lists the United States’ interests in the Middle East. 
This is based on the question “What decision will best serve the long-term national interests 
of the U.S.?” The main U.S. interests in the Middle East in 1970 were, 
1. That this area not become the arena or the trigger for a U.S.-Soviet confrontation. 
2. That this area not fall under Soviet predominance. 
3. That Israel survives. 
4. That the Arab nations continue to welcome an American presence. This was relevant to the 
U.S. effort to prevent Soviet predominance. But it is also related to protecting the 
investments of private Americans as well as some $1.5 billion in international income 
credited Government to protect American citizens (well over 10.000) working and living in 
this area.
182
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American concerns were not predominantly to protect Israeli interests, but their own. Nixon 
was worried about the fact that the Soviet Union seemed to be increasing its influence in the 
Middle East by exploiting the Arab countries’ frustration over the post-1967 stalemate. 
Moscow, Nixon believed, correctly calculated that the American people would not be willing 
to open a second military front until the Vietnam War was over.
183
 Nixon and Kissinger 
regarded Israel as a strategic asset in the Middle East and, by extension, in the global struggle 
against the Soviets. In addition, Israel had a lot of support in the American Congress and from 
the Israeli lobbying groups. The influence of these groups could contribute to forming the 
administration’s policymaking in Israel’s favour, and would make it difficult to sustain an 
even-handed approach to the Middle East.
184
 
 
Army capabilities 
National Security Study Memorandum 98, written by Henry Kissinger on 10 August 1970, 
contains a review of Israeli arms request that year. The document is still partially classified, 
but in a response to this memorandum, which was about options for U.S. arms assistance, it is 
written that,  
The UAR army of 170 000 has been recognized since the June 1967 war into three field armies 
of eleven divisions and twelve separate brigades. Soviet guidance in this reorganization and 
subsequent training has been directed toward organizational efficiency, increased 
mechanization, and training in combined arms operations... The effectiveness of the UAR army, 
however, has not significantly improved since 1967… While the Sinai holds little of practical 
value for the UAR, its loss had great emotional impact of the Arabs; regaining the Sinai is 
tremendously important for Nasser’s image in the Arab world.185 
The document describes the UAR army as inferior to the IDF, and that the UAR air force was 
estimated to consist of 17 000 men, 365 jet fighter bombs, 50 light and medium jet bombers, 
and approximately 200 combat-ready jet qualified pilots.
186
 And despite Soviet guidance, the 
UAR army had not significantly approved since 1967 compared to the IDF.  
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The Israeli Defence Force Army (IDFA) however, was an effective force of 72 000 personnel 
on active duty, capable of increasing to a power of 310 000 within one week of mobilisation. 
The ground forces were organised into seven task force headquarters controlling 34 brigades. 
These ground forces were capable of successfully defending Israel against simultaneous Arab 
attacks on all fronts or successfully defending two fronts while mounting major offensives on 
two fronts.
187
 The IDF also consisted of 261 jet fighters, two jet bombers, more than 650 
pilots, of which approximately 500 were jet qualified, asserted helicopter and transport 
aircraft and approximately 16 000 men. It was superior to the air force of any Arab state and 
could defeat any combination of Arab air forces if it did not suffer major damage in a pre-
emptive attack.
188
 The IDF was clearly superior to the UAR army, with a military force many 
times the size of the Arabs’. Despite only a few losses during the 1967 War, Israel still 
wanted more equipment from the United States. The IDF had only lost seven high 
performance and nine medium performance aircraft to non-combat causes since the war, but 
the UAR army had lost many more, and with a previously lower level of aircrafts.
189
  
According to the response to NSSM 98, the IDF was clearly superior in having a bigger army, 
more qualified pilots and more advanced equipment. Israel was a very small country, 
especially compared to some of the Arab states, and yet Israel had the capability to crush 
them all at the same time. Several countries in Western Europe, together with the Soviet 
Union and a number of Arab states in the Middle East, saw the Israelis’ need for more 
equipment as unnecessary and aggravating. The Nixon administration knew that by providing 
for Israel’s increasing military might, they could risk its relationship with powerful allies, and 
even risk a military confrontation with the Soviet Union. The U.S. did mark that the degree of 
Israeli superiority was not necessary. Despite this, the flow of weapons into Israel did not 
stop.
190
 
The Soviet Union continued to strengthen its influence in the region, by providing more 
military and financial support to its allies. The U.S. could not afford having a weakened 
Israel, and wanted to increase its own power in the Middle East while decreasing the Soviets’. 
To acquire the Arab states’ trust, the U.S.’ strategy was to downplay its shipments to Israel; 
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the government wanted to maintain a balance of power – a balance, they felt, that was 
threatened by recent introduction of Soviet missiles and combat pilots to Egypt and other 
military equipment to the Arab world.
191
 
 
The Jordan Civil War – Black September of 1970 
In September 1970, fighting broke out between the Jordanian army and the Palestinian 
guerrilla organisations, called Fedayeen. These groups had created a state within a state that 
posed a threat to the rule of King Hussein. Yasser Arafat’s organisation Fatah was the largest 
of the Fedayeen groups.
192
 Consequently, the King of Jordan ordered his army to disarm and 
break the power of these organisations, which resulted in a bloody civil war. Thousands of 
Palestinians were killed, and many more fled the country.
193
 In the middle of the crisis, one of 
the big Fedayeen groups, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP,) hijacked 
four international airliners. One of the planes was blown up over Cairo, after removing the 
passengers. Their objective was to force Israel to free Fedayeen prisoners and to provoke a 
full-scale confrontation with the Jordanian army.
194
 The Jordanian army retaliated, and within 
a few days, Syrian tanks crossed the border into northern Jordan to aid the Fedayeen. King 
Hussein asked the U.S. and Israel for help, and Kissinger requested for an Israeli air attack 
against the Syrian armoured forces. Kissinger promised that if the Egyptians renewed the 
fighting along the Canal Zone to aid the Syrian army, the United States would give Israel all 
the necessary military assistance.
195
 The need for Israeli intervention did not arise, as King 
Hussein and his army was able to push back the Syrians and defeat the Palestinian guerrilla 
groups.  
Nixon and Kissinger were convinced that Soviet provocation of the Palestinians was the 
reason for the civil war in Jordan and that the Soviet Union was behind Syria’s moves across 
the border.
196
 All evidence indicates that the Soviets, in fact, had not established a relationship 
with the Fedayeen, and that they had no reason to overthrow Hussein. Nixon and Kissinger 
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were stuck in a Cold War mind-set, a focus on a strategy that would guarantee Israel’s 
security in order to halt the Soviets’, and were therefore unable to view the Arab-Israeli 
conflict, or the Jordan crisis, from a neutral diplomatic perspective.
197
 According to the 
former Israeli Ambassador Yitzhak Rabin (1968-1973), Kissinger once stated that “[t]he 
President will never forget Israel’s role in preventing the deterioration in Jordan and in 
blocking the attempt to overturn the regime there. He said that the United States is fortunate 
in having an ally like Israel in the Middle East. These events will be taken into account in all 
future developments.”198  
 
The anti-SAM package of 1970 
After the War of Attrition and the Jordan crisis in 1970, the Israelis had proven their loyalty to 
the United States and Israel’s ability to protect other American interests in the region. Nixon 
had promised Israel more arms if the IDF would aid the Jordan army against the Syrians. 
Nixon had come to believe that it was “the threat of Israeli military might, demonstrated 
through Israeli overflights of Syrian armed columns,” that had caused a Jordan victory.199 
Israel had thereby kept its promise, and now it was the United States’ turn. Israel had 
requested more weapons, especially anti-SAM equipment able to destroy SAM sites. SAM is 
a surface-to-air missile, and with SHRIKE anti-radiation missiles, the Israelis would be able 
to suppress selected SAM radars that controlled the missiles.
200
  The Israelis had attacked 
Egyptian SAM sites during the War of Attrition, but many of those were not active, dummies 
as they were called. Once the sites were located, the Israelis needed electronic equipment to 
penetrate such sites without being badly hurt by other missiles. This package included not 
only this equipment, but also almost all of the United States’ most sophisticated weapons at 
that time.
201
   
In a memorandum for the President about follow-up actions with Israel from 3 October 1970, 
it was discussed whether or not the United States should provide such weapons to Israel. The 
American government believed that the Israelis would use this equipment to attack all missile 
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sites across the Suez Canal, whether or not the U.S. approved. The Egyptians would not roll 
back its missiles or agree to an indefinite cease-fire without any talks or signs of progress 
toward a settlement.
202
 The Israelis would not begin peace-talks without a SAM-rollback, and 
believed that by inflicting enough Egyptian and Soviet casualties they would perhaps lose 
heart and withdraw their SAMs from the Canal. Then again, the U.S. recognized that they 
could expect strong reactions from the Arab countries and the Soviets whenever aid was 
provided to Israel. The provided strategy was therefore to deliver one large package to Israel 
instead of two or three smaller ones, to make the Soviets’ and the Arab states’ “agony” short 
lived.
203
  
It was not only anti-SAM equipment that was included in this package. As Soviet airplanes, 
with Soviet trained pilots, were flying towards Egypt, Israel wanted its air force in top shape. 
The United States had, at this time, not enough equipment available for everyone it needed to 
support. In July 1970, U.S. production rates were scheduled to be drastically reduced and the 
government had planned a delivery of 10-20 F-4s to Iran. Simultaneously, Israel was pushing 
for more military equipment, and the United States was discussing whether or not it could 
divert the Iranian aircrafts to Israel instead.
204
 The total cost of the SAM-package was put 
forward in NSSM 98 and accounted for $163.693 million.
205
  
This package helped Israel raise its confidence level, and made Israel believe that it had no 
need to negotiate with its Arab neighbours who wanted to go back to the pre-1967 borders, 
because the Israelis believed that no Arab country would attack Israel as long as it had 
military supremacy. It gave the Israelis a false sense of security, which was shared by Henry 
Kissinger and the President, who argued that Israel’s military superiority would acquire the 
Arabs to deal with Washington instead of Moscow since this would expose Soviet 
weakness.
206
 The Soviets had been much more involved in the Middle East during 1970, than 
before, and for that reason, the United States needed to strengthen its allies. This need resulted 
in the first long-term arms deal with Israel in late 1971. Since the Nixon Administration 
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considered the War of Attrition a result of Soviet involvement, the United States needed now, 
more than ever, a strong Israel.
207
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4 A Changing Relationship, 1971-1973 
 
In December 1971, a profound shift in Nixon’s policy towards Israel took place. As a result of 
this policy change Nixon dramatically raised the scale of his administration’s commitment to 
Israel and increased American financial aid, diplomatic backing, and military supplies to the 
country.
208
 Israel had openly supported the United States’ approach in Vietnam and the 
upcoming presidential elections in 1972, in favour of Nixon, as well as prepared to intervene 
in the Jordan crisis on America’s behalf by keeping the Israeli Defence Force (IDF) on 
military alert
209
  This won appreciation from the White House and fostered a sense of 
common purpose as well as strengthening Washington’s faith that Israel was an important 
strategic ally in the Middle East.
210
 
The large-scale U.S. military and financial assistance to Israel after 1971 was one of the 
consequences of the three previously fought Arab-Israeli wars. These wars had created a 
mutual thought among the American public and governments that Israel was constantly under 
attack from its neighbouring Arab countries. During this year, the United States provided 
Israel with military loans of around $545 million, and by 1974, Israel had become the largest 
recipient of U.S. foreign assistance in the world.
211
 In a memorandum to President Richard 
Nixon from 27 February 1973, the Minister of Finance George P. Shultz wrote,  
[I]n [Fiscal Year] FY 1971 we began providing Israel high levels of assistance, partly in order 
to strengthen their economy and very weak balance of payments situations. Their position [in 
1973] has turned around completely to the point were substantially lower levels of United States 
assistance for the coming fiscal year can be considered… While the Israelis agree their situation 
is strong, they still believe one more year’s high level of assistance is needed.212 
 
The United States was very concerned about increased Soviet influence in the Middle East 
after the War of Attrition in 1969-1970, and wanted to stop communist infiltration, and keep 
its diplomatic relationship with the other Arab states. The U.S. also regarded Israel as an 
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equal, democratic country that had “guts and moxey” as Nixon described them.213 Therefore, 
the U.S.’ financial and military support to Israel was high, and it became even higher when 
Nixon introduced the first long-term arms deal with Israel in late 1971, and ordered a full-
scale airlift to Israel during the 1973 October war.  
 
Building its own defence 
In the 1950s, the local production of military equipment in Israel was limited to ammunition, 
small arms, and the Uzi sub-machine gun. This was inadequate to Israel’s needs, and during 
the 1960s, The Israeli Government experienced a lot of uncertainty and insecurity with 
consideration to external sources of weapons. This led the Israel’s policymakers to embark on 
the development of its own arms production capability.
214
  In the 1970s, Israel began to 
produce combat aircrafts, such as the Kfir, air-to-air missiles, fast patrol boats, the Merkava 
main battle tank (MBT), and other major weapons systems. All of this led to a massive 
growth in the domestic defence industry in terms of both employment and investment. From 
1966 to 1975 the Israeli defence industry absorbed approximately 60 per cent of new 
employees in the manufacturing sector.
215
 From the mid-1970s the “production of combat 
aircraft became the core of Israel Aircraft Industries (IAI) activities. The number of 
employees grew to over 20,000, making IAI the largest industrial firm in Israel.”216 
After the Jordan crisis in September 1970, the United States came to believe that Israel was an 
important ally worthy of protection and support. Therefore, the U.S. had started to ship 
equipment to Israel in order for it to establish its own military production industry. On 22 
December 1970, Washington signed a Master Defence Data Exchange Agreement that 
provided a great transfer of technology. This was provided via several technical data 
packages. These packages consisted of blueprints, plans and types of materials for 
construction of new weapons. More than 120 of these production packages were given to 
Israel over the next eight years.
217
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Although the United States did provide Israel with the equipment to be self-sufficient, the 
Jewish state still wanted large sums of both economic and military aid. The reason behind its 
high requests was that Israel wanted to sustain its high growth rate at approximately 8 per 
cent, while at the same time maintain its extensive military superiority over its neighbouring 
countries in the Middle East.
218
 In 1970, the United States could not explain all the projected 
Israeli government expenditures, and in a response to Israel’s military equipment requests a 
memorandum was drafted, stating that,  
[t]he requests for economic assistance, together with the growing number of applications for 
production rights and licenses to manufacture military equipment in Israel indicates that Israel 
wants (by 1974 if possible) to develop its own capability to manufacture major armaments in 
quantities sufficient to support export trade, and to continue at full speed existing nuclear and 
missile program. In effect, what seems to underlie Israel’s requests for financial assistance is the 
goal of achieving all this – while at the same time sustaining a full employment economic 
growth rate of 8% yearly and building reserves.
219
 
 
Washington assessed the advantages and disadvantages of the self-sufficiency Israel wanted 
to achieve and what this would do to the U.S. relationship with Jerusalem. On the one hand, it 
would be helpful to the United States’ position in the Middle East to become less closely 
identified with Israel. This would not happen as long as the United States continued to ship 
major military equipment to the country. Even before, and during the War of Attrition from 
1969 to 1970, Washington knew that there would be consequences for the U.S. if it provided 
military equipment and additional aircrafts to Israel.  
Assistant Secretary of Near Eastern and South Asian affairs Joseph Sisco (1969-1974) 
believed that if the United States provided the means for an Israeli military production 
capability in addition to delivering other military armaments, this would be interpreted not 
only among the Arab states, but the general world as a whole, to mean that the U.S. firstly, 
“had moved to intensify the arms race; second, was not serious about arms limitations; third, 
had discounted the peace efforts; and fourth, had decided to give Israel a blank check to play 
the game its own way”.220 The Americans were afraid of what the Arabs’ reactions would be, 
such as violence against American citizens in the area, and damage to U.S. economic interests 
in the Middle East. Kissinger, however, believed that if the United States did not give a 
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positive response to Israel on their frequent request for additional aircrafts and the means for 
creating a production capability, this would harden the Israelis’ attitude toward the peace 
proposal and make them less inclined to reassess their position.
221
 
On the other hand, the U.S. feared that by making Israel capable of producing its own military 
equipment, this would “turn over to Israel the capacity to make war or peace on its own terms 
and in a way that could challenge the USSR to involve itself.”222 The Nixon administration 
did not want Israel to feel as though it was nearly invincible, due to the possibility that this 
could delay any peace settlements even further. Yet the U.S. could not stop Israel’s natural 
growth, and in the eyes of the Arab states the United States was, and would always remain, 
the creator of Israel. No matter what the U.S. decided, the Nixon administration believed that 
the Arab states would still feel that the United States backed Israel regardless of its policies.
223
 
The U.S. was uncertain of what they should do concerning Israel in this matter. The American 
government had concluded, in the past, that the Israeli need for more aid was much less acute 
than Israel previously had expressed. In a memorandum for the President from the Office of 
Management and Budget in the White House from September 1970, it is stated that, 
Enough evidence is available to suggest that Israel could do more to reduce foreign exchange 
requirements and the need for assistance from the United States. While a rising standard of 
living and a high growth rate are desirable objectives, the United States should not have to 
relieve Israel of all financial sacrifices. Accordingly, policies designed to shift resources from 
consumption to exports would seem desirable as part of a self-help effort by Israel.
224
 
As it is shown in the memoranda, the U.S. had many thoughts on and perceptions of what 
Israel wanted and what it actually needed to maintain its security level. The United States 
wanted Israel to be self-sufficient, but also wished for the Israelis to have realistic views, and 
to understand that the more they asked for, the more money the U.S. had to put up, and this 
would eventually impact the American society as a whole. If, on the other hand, the American 
government gave in to Israel’s requests, this could have a psychological impact on its 
relationship with Jerusalem. It could buy the United States some leverage over Israel, a 
leverage that could be used to push Israel in the right direction concerning a peace settlement 
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and the acceptance of U.N. Resolution 242.
225
 That Israel had such a big arsenal of military 
equipment during the 1970s is apparent, and even though its arsenal was bigger than any other 
country in the Middle East, this did not stop the Israelis from wanting more and ever more 
military and financial supplies. 
 
A standstill period 
From the end of the Jordan Civil War in September 1970, prior to the outbreak of the October 
War in 1973, the Middle East seemed fairly stable to the Washington policymakers. Nixon 
and Kissinger believed that this stability was due to the military balance in the region in 
favour of Israel.
226
 After receiving the big anti-SAM package in October 1970 from the 
United States, Israel was pleased by the good relationship it had made with the Nixon 
administration.  
The State Department, Nixon and even Kissinger at this point, agreed that it was in America’s 
best interest to be on good terms with the Arab states in the Middle East. They believed that it 
was important to reach a settlement with the parties involved in the Arab-Israeli conflict, and 
to achieve peace in the region. Nonetheless, they had different ideas on how to best achieve 
these goals. Nixon and Kissinger believed that keeping Israel strong by military means was 
the ideal way to go. The President and his National Security Adviser pursued a policy of 
matching the Soviet arms to Egypt with their own to Israel, thus ruling out the possibility of 
Egypt having military supremacy in the region.
227
 The State Department, however, was not as 
enthusiastic about granting Israel such a big amount of military equipment and financial 
assistance during the War of Attrition or the Jordan crisis as Nixon and Kissinger had been. 
The State Department believed that by granting military and financial help to the enemies of 
the Arabs, this would increase the Soviets’ influence in the region, and drive the Arab states 
further away from the U.S.
228
  
The State Department believed that Israel could be persuaded to be more forthcoming in its 
negotiation stance if arms were withheld and wanted to use this as leverage to get peace-
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settlement talks started. Kissinger did not agree with this view. He argued that this would 
simply make the Israelis feel more insecure, and therefore less cooperative. He also believed 
that this would make the Arab states believe that a military solution could be possible for 
regaining their territories lost to the Israelis in the Six-Day War in 1967, and to give the 
Palestinian refugees back their homes. Kissinger argued that the Arab states would turn to 
diplomacy only if they saw that the Soviet Union could not deliver military equipment that 
surpassed the Israelis.
229
 After the Jordan crisis, Nixon and Kissinger succeeded in 
undermining the State Department’s initiatives, and established almost complete control over 
foreign policy making, especially with concerns to the Middle East. Since there were no signs 
of any peace agreements in the region, Nixon focused on maintaining the military balance in 
the region in Israel’s favour.230 Although there seemed to be no signs of any peace settlements 
in the Middle East, this was not a result of a lack of trying on the part of the State Department.  
 
The interim canal agreement, Israel and Egypt 1970-1971  
After the Jordan crisis, Egypt was willing to accept a three-month cease-fire with Israel in 
November 1970. Sadat expected to resume the Jarring talks and that this would eventually 
give results. In the early 1970s, Jarring resumed his work by trying to break the diplomatic 
deadlock that had been there since 1969. Now, he wanted a more active role in the mediation 
between the parties, with the help from the United States. Jarring’s aim was an overall peace 
settlement between Egypt and Israel, and his mission was somewhat taken over by the interim 
canal agreement in 1971.
231
  
Anwar al-Sadat, who succeeded as the new Egyptian President after Nasser’s sudden death on 
28 September 1970, held a speech for the Egyptian National Assembly on 4 March 1971. In 
his speech, he stated that “[i]f Israel withdrew her forces in Sinai to the [Mita and Giddi] 
Passes… I would be willing to reopen the Suez Canal; to have my forces cross the East Bank 
[of the Suez Canal]…to make a solemn, official declaration of a cease-fire by six, rather than 
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three months; to restore diplomatic relations with the United States; and sign a peace 
agreement with Israel through the efforts of Dr. Jarring.”232 
Sadat appealed to Nixon the day after, on 5 March, to launch an initiative that could bring 
about an interim agreement based on the suggestions he had expressed through his speech. It 
was not until late May 1971 that Nixon came to consider that Sadat was serious about this 
new attitude toward Israel and his commitment for an interim agreement to be implemented. 
Nixon, therefore, ordered the State Department to begin working on an interim canal 
settlement. He provided this explanation to Secretary Rogers - “[I]t is essential that no more 
aid programs for Israel be approved until they agree to some kind of interim action on the 
Suez or some other issue…the interests of the United States will be served…by tilting the 
policy…on the side of 100 million Arabs rather than on the side of two million Israelis.”233 
Nixon had possibly begun to understand that to maintain American interests in the region, the 
U.S. could not always be on the side of Israel. No matter what Israel felt about this agreement, 
it was the best for every country in the Middle East that an interim agreement was being 
realised. 
The idea of Sadat’s proposal worried the Israelis. In March 1971, Sisco presented the initial 
ideas that the U.S. had discussed with the Egyptians. In this paper, it was suggested that 
“Israel should withdraw its forces to a distance of forty kilometres from the canal; the 
evacuated area would be demilitarized; Egyptian technicians and up to seven hundred 
policemen would be allowed into a ten-kilometer-wide strip along the east bank of the canal.” 
After six months, the canal would be opened to all shipping. The agreement would also 
“constitute a first step toward the full implementation of Resolution 242, and both sides 
would be free to review the cease-fire after one year.”234  
Golda Meir was deeply affected by David Ben-Gurion, and shared his views about the 
hostility of the Arabs and that the way of dealing with them was from a position of strength. 
Therefore, the idea of withdrawal from the occupied territories without a peace treaty was out 
of the question for Meir, who also had the ultimate responsibility for the defence policy.
235
 
Because of this, the Israelis had some demands before they were willing to take part in an 
agreement, and formed a counterproposal. Israel wanted the canal to be reopened to the 
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shipping of all nations (as Sadat had agreed to); “the unlimited duration of the cease-fire; the 
withdrawal of Israeli forces to a distance to be agreed; no Egyptian military forces in the area 
to be evacuated by Israel; the thinning out of Egyptian forces on the western side of the canal; 
and the release of all prisoners of war.”236  
To get the process started, the Nixon administration had promised the delivery of 12 
additional Phantoms if the Israelis could deliver a counterproposal to the Egyptian proposition 
from March. The counterproposal was accepted by Nixon two days later, but it did not get the 
President’s full support.237 Kissinger knew that the Israelis never would agree to withdrawal 
or the station of Egyptian troops alongside the Canal, and accept the Egyptian demands. The 
National Security advisor had therefore lost faith in the whole agreement, together with the 
rest of the White House. The State Department, however, still hoped to achieve some kind of 
agreement, and tried to keep the talks going by travelling to the Middle East. They were 
ultimately not able to get an interim agreement in place, which resulted in the end of Roger’s 
and Sisco’s predominance as Middle East policymakers. Nixon and Kissinger would take the 
reins in the making of foreign-policy, and told the State Department not to come up with any 
new initiatives until after the presidential elections in 1972.
238
 
In May 1971, Egypt and the Soviet Union signed a treaty of cooperation and friendship. This 
concerned the United States as this memo from Henry Kissinger in 1971 shows, 
In spite of the continuing cease-fire and the readiness of both Israel and Egypt to try and reach 
an interim agreement through us, both sides have continued to build their military might. We 
have exercised restraint in the supply of military equipment to the Middle East. The Soviet 
Union, however, has continued to build its military presence in Egypt and to provide large 
amounts of sophisticated weaponry to Egypt and other Arab countries…We will seek to bring 
about increasing relations of confidence with Arab states who wish to be friendly with us, but 
without in any way undercutting our close relationship with Israel.
239
 
The United States believed that they had exercised a restraint on the supply of military 
equipment to the Middle East. As previously mentioned, the U.S. pursued a policy of 
matching Soviet military equipment to Egypt with its own to Israel. In reality, the U.S. had 
restrained its supply of military equipment to the Middle East compared to the Soviet Union, 
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but this would soon change when in December 1971 the first long-term arms deal between the 
U.S. and Israel was created. 
240
  
 
U.S. arms deal with Israel, 1971 
After several discussions between Nixon and the Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir, she 
announced, on 28 December 1971, that Israel was ready to return to the Jarring talks.
241
 A 
reason for this might be that during a visit to Washington in December by Golda Meir, the 
United States signed the first long-term arms deal with Israel. The U.S. agreed to provide new 
Phantom and Skyhawk aircrafts over a three-year period. By signing this agreement, 
Washington could avoid repeated discussions and supply disruptions whenever the short-term 
agreements had expired.
242
 This was a big turning-point in the American relationship with 
Israel since no such agreement had been formed in the past.
243
  
In a memorandum for Kissinger and the White House from the Special Assistant to the 
Secretary and Executive Secretary of the Department of State Theodore Elliot Jr. (1969-
1973), in December 1971, it was discussed whether or not it was a good idea to give the 
Israelis a firm commitment on more aircraft at that point.  Before the visit from Golda Meir, 
the State and Defence departments did not believe that it was an appropriate time to give 
Israel a firm commitment on more aircrafts. They wanted to propose to the Israelis a “limited 
aircraft supply program under which we would not further increase the number of U.S. planes 
in the Israeli air force but would replace aircraft lost by attrition and would provide trainer 
aircraft. This would mean supplying about 15 aircraft a year rather than 30 or so the Israelis 
want.”244 At the same time, the departments recommended granting Israel the necessary aid to 
be able to produce up to 100 of its own aircrafts, the “Super Mirage” as it was called. They 
did not believe that Israel needed more aircrafts to uphold its clear military superiority, and 
especially not when Israel began to produce its own combat aircrafts.
245
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Nevertheless, the arms agreement was formed and the advice from the State and Defence 
Departments was not taken into account. Instead, the increased arms deliveries to Israel suited 
Nixon and Kissinger’s foreign policies. They both used arms sales as a “carrot and stick” 
approach, the carrots being military equipment and the stick meant the threat of withholding 
weapons, to gain support from foreign leaders and thereby increase American influence in the 
Middle East.
246
 Nixon, Rogers and Secretary of Defence Melvin Larid, were initially worried 
if the arms deliveries to Israel might have negative effects on the U.S.’ diplomatic relations 
with the Arab States. Kissinger, however, believed that with limitations and continuity in the 
arms sales to Israel, this would serve as a signal to the Soviet Union and the Arabs that aiding 
Israel with military equipment would eventually bring a peace settlement into place.
247
  
The United States knew that Israel was not willing to cooperate with Egypt, or themselves for 
that matter, if the country did not get what it wanted in terms of military supplies. Israel had 
stated that it would not continue with the interim agreement if the American government did 
not resume its supplies of Phantom jets and Skyhawks to Israel. Jerusalem saw the 
continuation of U.S. supply of high-performance aircraft to Israel as being the most 
convincing evidence of the American support for their country. Therefore, the Israelis could 
continue with the peace efforts because they knew that the United States would support their 
cause.
248
 
Another reason for this agreement to be possible was that several American politicians 
supported an arms deal with Israel. Several congressmen were supportive of increased 
assistance to Israel and therefore it was, in a political sense, dangerous to ignore their calls. 
The presidential elections were coming up in 1972, and increased aid to Israel would earn the 
President many votes from the American Jewish population, in addition to other supporters 
for Israel’s cause. Funding for Nixon’s campaign was also an important factor in winning the 
election, and much of this came from Jewish contributors.
249
 The new arms deal in 1971 was 
also possible as a result of Sadat’s visit to Moscow in October where he was promised 
increased military assistance. This alarmed the United States.
250
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On 18 July 1972, Sadat surprised the world by expelling fifteen thousand Soviet military 
advisers from Egypt and placing his own forces in control of the Soviet bases and its military 
equipment. In Sadat’s own autobiography, the Egyptian president explains why he did it: 
“One of the reasons behind my decision was the Soviet attitude toward me; but another 
important reason was that within the strategy I had laid down, no war could be fought while 
Soviet experts worked in Egypt.”251 Sadat’s expelling of the Soviet personnel was also a 
consequence of the Soviet Union not fulfilling its promises that were made in October 1971 to 
increase its military assistance to Egypt.
252
 Still, the Soviet personnel were recalled shortly 
after, and the flow of Soviet weaponry into Egypt was resumed. Sadat received the most 
advanced equipment the Soviets had, such as anti-aircraft missiles, MiG fighters, tanks, 
armour-piercing missiles and other high performance armaments. The Egyptians had attained 
what the Soviets had promised them for cooperating with the interim agreement in 1971.
253
 
One of the reasons for the United States’ concern regarding the agreement signed between the 
Soviet Union and Egypt was the fear of increased Soviet influence in the Middle East. The 
U.S. justified its supply efforts to Israel with that argument, and although they did give 
military aid to other allied countries in the Middle East, Israel got a lot more, especially after 
1971. In a memoranda to Nixon from 13 May 1972 it was stated that,  
[s]upplies from both the Soviet Union and the U.S. have reached such a magnitude and level of 
sophistication that there are few areas left to limit. Israel’s existing military superiority is so 
substantial that a U.S. proposal for embargo would be synonymous to a recommendation for 
permanent Egyptian/Arab military inferiority, the thrust of U.S. supplies have been in support 
of Israel’s offensive oriented military strategy… Israel’s relatively impressive advance toward 
self-sufficiency in many areas of weapons production would further render in workable (from 
the Egyptian standpoint) efforts to limit foreign weapons supplies.
254
 
 
The October War of 1973 
From 1971, throughout the period leading up to the October War in 1973, the Meir 
government chose a policy of not formulating any particular doctrine, contingency plan or any 
other foreign policies. Meir, instead, chose not to decide until a decision was forced upon 
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Israel by their opponents.
255
 As Historian Avner Yaniv writes, “[t]his principle became the 
origin of a catastrophe because of the prevalence of three critical assumptions in IDF 
thinking.” These three assumptions were: 1)”that intelligence would ensure an adequate 
advance warning”; 2) “that the government would not desist from a decision to authorize an 
interceptive strike if and when Arab moves suggested that an attack was imminent”; and 3) 
“that the very least [what] the government would authorize would be a large scale 
mobilization of reserves.”256 In a memorandum from Kissinger to Nixon from February 1973, 
Kissinger wrote that “Mrs. Meir declared that she will be bringing no new ideas to 
Washington because the old ones [are] still good, since conditions in the area have not 
changed and because the Arabs persist in their old objectives. She stressed that it was only the 
strength of the Israeli armed forces which can hope to assure stability in the Middle East.”257 
This lack of policies and the Israeli unwillingness to agree to the interim agreement were the 
reasons for the Israeli surprise on the morning of 6 October, the holiest day in Israel and for 
the Jews world-wide, called Yom Kippur, when Syria and Egypt attacked the Israeli forces in 
the Sinai Peninsula and the Golan Heights.
258
  
The Israeli Minister of Foreign Affairs Abba Eban, once recalled that “[b]y 1973 the 
diplomatic deadlock, the failure of the Jarring mission, the strong support given by the Nixon-
Kissinger administration to an attrition policy, all created a climate of exuberant self-
confidence that began to border on fantasy…reaching a somewhat absurd level in 1973.”259 
Having won the previous Arab-Israeli wars, the IDF and the Israeli Government felt that there 
was no need to discard what already seemed to be the recipe for success. Accordingly, Israel 
assumed that what it needed in the future was merely more of the same, a strong and still 
growing military defence.
260
 After the 1967 war, Israel had gained a newfound confidence. 
The occupation of the Sinai, the West Bank, and of the Golan Heights gave the Jewish state 
strategic depth, the advantage of physical barriers, an extended lead time in terms of alert, and 
leverage against the Arabs.
261
 One of Israel’s many failures during this time was to 
underestimate the importance Egypt attached to Sinai. It was not just because it was an 
advantage to have in war-time, but also because it was part of their country and heritage. The 
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thought that the Egyptians would find the continued occupation of the peninsula intolerable 
did rarely occur to Israel.
262
  
The tendency to view Middle East issues in the context of the Cold War led the United States 
to overlook several promising opportunities for peace agreements between Israel and Egypt. 
Sadat had at several times between 1971 and 1973 sought to make a deal.
263
 Although this 
was a mistake on Washington’s part, the United States was still very much involved in 
Vietnam, Cambodia, the opening to China, and with the Presidential elections in 1972 during 
these years. The administration was also involved in serious negotiations with the Soviet 
Union regarding limiting strategic armaments in the world.
264
 In June 1973, General Secretary 
of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union Leonid Brezhnev 
(1964-1982) visited Washington for the first time. There, he warned the Americans that the 
Egyptians and Syrians were intent on going to war with Israel and that the Soviet Union could 
not stop it from happening. He told the United States that only a new American initiative and 
an Israeli withdrawal to the pre-1967 borders could prevent a war.
265
 Despite all the evidence 
of an upcoming war, Israel and the United States did not take the threat seriously. The two 
countries had all the available information to come up with a strategy, or at least try to get an 
interim agreement in place, but did not use it.
266
  
Egypt and Syria’s aim in the October War was to break the political stalemate that had been 
present since the effort for an interim settlement started in 1971. They sought to provoke an 
international crisis that would force the superpowers to get involved and make them pressure 
Israel to withdraw from the territories it had occupied since 1967.
267
 One of the U.S.’ policies 
after the 1967 war had been that there would be no military confrontations so long as the Arab 
states faced a definite defeat. The military balance in favour of Israel was the key to stability 
as the Americans saw it, and therefore it came as a big shock when Syria and Egypt brought 
its forces into Israeli territory on 6 October.
268
  
Each day of war cost Israel $250 million. Within one month that had added to Israel’s entire 
annual Gross National Product (GNP), and taken the lives of around three thousand Israelis 
                                                 
262
 Yaniv 1987: 170-171 
263
 Mearsheimer & Walt 2006: 53 
264
 Quandt 2005: 86 
265
 Quandt 2005: 101-102 
266
 Ibid 
267
 Shlaim 2000: 319 
268
 Quandt 2005: 105 
61 
 
and 8500 Arabs. It made Israel more dependent on the U.S. and it emphasised that Israel did 
not have many friends in the world after the Arab oil embargo following the war.
269
 The 
October War also reshaped American policymaking for the rest of Nixon’s presidency. From 
this point on, the war had set in motion an intense diplomatic process that would focus on the 
Middle Eastern peace process and a shuttle diplomacy that Kissinger set in motion after 
October 1973.
270
 
 
The airlift 
By the eve of the war, the administration had essentially accepted Israel’s status quo in the 
Middle East and the American financial assistance to Israel had nearly quadrupled since 
Nixon took office. The sale of sophisticated American military equipment had been 
institutionalised with the arms deal of 1971, and Israel had proven to be an important strategic 
ally to the United States. In the midst of the October 1973 War, it was Nixon who made the 
final decision to send a massive airlift to Israel on 14 October, as a response to the Soviet 
airlift to Egypt and Syria a few days earlier.
271
  
At the beginning of the conflict, Kissinger was convinced that Israel would ask for more 
military aid during the war. Israel did just that, but despite their appeals for more military 
supplies, the U.S. was reluctant to provide the quantity of ammunition and military equipment 
Israel had asked for. The United States did not believe that Israel was in need of more 
ammunition so soon into the fighting. Regardless of its reservations, the U.S. did not want the 
Arabs to win the war on the grounds that this might increase Soviet influence in the region, 
and started to ship relatively small amounts of military supplies to Israel. The Nixon 
administration hoped for an early end to the fighting and that Israel would be the victorious 
part.
272
 By 8 October, Egyptian and Syrian forces had repossessed some of their previously 
lost territories from Israel, and the pressure on the United States to provide arms for the 
Jewish state increased. The reason for the administration’s reluctance was that they believed 
that Israel would crush the Arab states within a few days of the hostilities anyway, and that 
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they feared Soviet interference in the war whenever the U.S. increased its military assistance 
to Israel.
273
 
During the first days of the conflict, Israel was suffering losses on both fronts. After almost a 
week, Israel was ready to agree to a cease-fire because of shortages of equipment and 
ammunition, but Egypt was not. By 8 and 9 October, it began to appear that the war would 
last longer than the United States had anticipated, and as the conflict lasted throughout the 
first week it became more and more difficult for the Nixon administration to keep Israel’s 
confidence in the Americans as an ally and provider of its security, while simultaneously 
convincing the Arabs that the U.S. was not providing much help to Israel by providing more 
military equipment.
274
  
On 12 October, the Soviet Union began an airlift to Damascus consisting of several hundred 
tons of equipment. Soviet supplies to Egypt and Syria assured that the fighting would not stop 
on the Arab side for lack of equipment. The Arabs were in a position to fight a prolonged, 
low-intensity war of attrition that could force the Israelis to remain mobilised and alert for a 
long period of time. The U.S.’ solution to the problem was to provide Israel with sufficient 
economic and military support in order to ensure that a war of attrition would not succeed.
275
 
The U.S. used the same strategy as before, to match Soviet equipment to the Arabs with the 
same, or even more, to the Israelis. The Soviet airlift to Syria, therefore, gave the United 
States the opportunity to deliver more weapons to Israel, because the United States had 
previously stated that the Nixon administration would not be the first to send military 
equipment to the Middle East during this crisis.
276
  
That same day, the Israelis had suffered many casualties and heavy loss of equipment on both 
fronts. Therefore, Golda Meir sent several messages to President Nixon urging for military 
assistance. The United States now feared that if they did not send an airlift of a substantial 
amount of military equipment to Israel, it was not impossible that the Israelis would resort to 
the use of nuclear weapons.
277
 Although some state officials believed that Jerusalem was 
being overly pessimistic in order to get more military equipment, the administration was not 
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willing to take that risk.
278
 Helmut Sonnenfeldt, a member of the National Security Council, 
wrote to Kissinger on 13 October that “[n]o matter how much in pain [they are in], the Israelis 
will probably use an atomic bomb before they concede the 1967 borders – not to mention 
what Senator Jackson will use here at home if we attempt to extract such a concession at this 
time. On the other hand, the Arabs will never yield on the 1967 borders, or the 
Palestinians.”279 These might only have been empty threats, or Israel’s way of saying that it 
would never give up its territories voluntarily despite heavy pressure. Due to the United 
States’ deep-rooted fear for getting involved in a conflict with the Soviet Union, the airlift to 
Israel seemed to be the safest approach for avoiding a possible nuclear confrontation.
280
 
There had been several delays with the deliveries of replacement supplies to Israel during the 
first eight days of the war. The United States had hoped for an early cease-fire, and did not 
want to move too quickly in the matter of providing resupply efforts to Israel. Seeing that the 
cease-fire initiative did not take hold, and the increased Soviet deliveries of weapons to Egypt 
and Syria, Nixon sent a message on 13 October, through Kissinger at the Washington Special 
Actions Group (WSAG) meeting - a subdivision of the NSC chaired by Kissinger.
281
  The 
message stated that if there were any further delays in carrying out orders, they wanted the 
resignation of the officials involved.
282
 Nixon took the delays in the resupply efforts very 
seriously. The Israelis had been frustrated over the slow rate of the American resupply efforts 
before the airlift was put in place. The reason for the withholding of supplies to Israel was that 
the administration had worked on a strategy of trying to supply Israel quietly, without pushing 
the Arabs closer to the Soviet Union. “In order to help the White House withstand the 
pressures of Israel and her American supporters while he waited for the optimal moment, 
Kissinger blamed the Defence Department for the delays.”283 Nixon was very preoccupied 
with his own problems concerning the Watergate scandal, so Kissinger kept him informed 
through telephone conversations. Therefore, it is possible to assume that Nixon believed the 
Defence Department was in some way guilty of delaying the resupply efforts to Israel. 
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Nevertheless, it was only after Nixon had received a message from Meir pleading for more 
equipment that Nixon wanted the delays to stop and the resupply efforts to begin.
284
 
At the same WSAG meeting on 13 October, Kissinger accounted for the U.S.’ objectives in 
the war:  
[T]o maintain contact with both sides. For this the best outcome would be an Israeli victory but 
it would come at a high price, so we could insist that they ensure their security through 
negotiations, not through military power. Second, we attempted to produce a situation where the 
Arabs would conclude the only way to peace was through us. But during the war we had to 
show the Israelis they had to depend on us to win and couldn’t win if we were too 
recalcitrant.
285
 
Kissinger also stated, that “[a]n Arab victory, even with American acquiescence, will look 
like American weakness. The Israelis have now slowed because of the shortages; now they 
might crank up when we want them to stop.”286 Kissinger did not initially want a massive 
airlift; he believed that this would make the U.S. lose its ties to the Arab states, but he was not 
the one to make that call. The Nixon administration did not want an Arab victory because this 
would weaken the United States’ influence in the Middle East, and increase Arab states’ 
dependence on the Soviet Union. The U.S. wanted the Arab states to turn to the United States 
in the aftermath of the War and could not risk losing its alliances.
 287
 
On 13 October Nixon ordered that all available aircrafts would be used for a full-scale airlift 
of military equipment to Israel, the biggest airlift in U.S. history. One of the main 
considerations of the decision to provide such an airlift was to convince Egypt and the Soviet 
Union that a prolonged war would not be the answer to peace in the Middle East, and to 
demonstrate to the Soviets that the United States was capable of matching Soviet military 
deliveries to Egypt and Syria with their own to Israel.
288
 The Israelis had argued that even 
though they had evidence of a possible Egyptian and Syrian attack, they did not pre-empt. 
The Israeli government had listened to the U.S. advice to not be the first to strike. Because of 
this, the Israelis were in a defensive position, something they had not been in during the 
previous wars.
289
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In a telephone conversation between Kissinger and Nixon from 14 October, they spoke about 
the airlift, and that it did not matter whether they were sending 3 planes or 300, they would 
get blamed just as much. No other country would let the airplanes intended for Israel fly over 
their airspace, and therefore the only way to get Skyhawks and Phantoms to Israel was to put 
them on American transport planes. Nixon believed that if you did something, you might as 
well go all in, and that was exactly what the United States did.
290
   
On 14 October, the first C-5 transport planes arrived in Israel. From that day until 25 October, 
“the U.S. delivered approximately 11,000 tons of equipment, forty F-4 Phantoms, thirty-six 
A-4 Skyhawks, and twelve C-130 transports […] from October 26 until the airlift ended on 
November 15, another 11,000 tons of equipment were delivered. In all, 147 sorties were 
flown by C-5s with 10,800 tons aboard, and 421 sorties by C-141s with 11,500 tons.”291 The 
main goal for the United States was to deliver around 25 per cent more military armaments to 
Israel than the Soviet Union delivered to Egypt and Syria, and the airlift also contained highly 
sophisticated military equipment that Israel did not previously own.
292
 
In another WSAG meeting on 16 October, Kissinger stressed that it was important that the 
Soviet Union were able to see that the U.S. was capable of delivering more military 
equipment than they were. It was also central to keep a good relationship with Israel before 
the impending diplomatic initiatives after the war. In that case, Kissinger argued for a large 
aid bill of $3 billion. That same day, the President announced that the U.S. would grant $2.2 
billion in aid for Israel to cover the cost of the airlift.
293
 Even though Israel had gained the 
advantage against the Syrian and Egyptian troops by the point the airlift was in place, the U.S. 
supplied Israel with enough military equipment to keep a War of Attrition going. In 
maintaining its good relationship with Israel, the United States believed that by providing the 
airlift, the Israelis could be more inclined to participate in the peace efforts. It did bring on 
consequences however, such as the Arab oil embargo. The embargo put severe strains on the 
United States’ relationship with its Western, Asian, and Arab allies, and made Israel even 
more isolated in the world.
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5 Consequences of U.S. Military and 
Financial Assistance to Israel, 1973-
1974 
 
From the start of Richard Nixon’s presidency, Nixon had always been concerned with foreign 
policy-issues such as ending the war in Vietnam, and the crisis in the Middle East. In March 
1973 Nixon ended the Vietnam War, and his approval rating reached 70 per cent. He would 
soon reach the bottom, however, when the Watergate scandal was known to the public. No 
president in American history has suffered such a major collapse of credibility as fast at 
Nixon did. The United States was suffering high inflation because of the Arab oil embargo, 
and the unemployment rates were high during the President’s final time in the White House. 
This had only made Nixon’s reputation worse, and many Americans had therefore lost faith in 
their President.
295
 
The costs of supporting Israel during the early 1970s had been great and had, at times, 
undermined the United States’ own ideals and interests. An example of this can be found in 
regards to the October war in 1973, and as Donald Neff writes, “[n]o fighting took place in 
Israel itself and the Jewish state fought mainly to retain the Arab territory it occupied in 
violation of the UN Charter and America’s own policy against acquiring territory by force.”296 
Despite its policy, this did not stop the United States from giving Israel unprecedented 
diplomatic, military, and financial aid, such as the airlift during the October War in 1973. The 
immediate result of this was the Arab oil embargo, which severely impacted the U.S. and the 
rest of the world, and caused strains on the U.S.-Soviet relationship.
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The oil embargo 
Once the 1973 October War had started, the Washington Special Actions Group (WSAG) 
held a series of meetings on war-related issues, including the potential for an Arab oil 
embargo. Since Nixon was preoccupied with the domestic difficulties caused by the 
Watergate scandal, the President had given Kissinger his full support and authority, and had 
told Kissinger that the commitments he made during the discussions with the Soviets had the 
President’s complete support.298 To handle the oil crisis, the Nixon administration had to 
cooperate with major Western industrial powers. This led to the establishment of the 
International Energy Agency (IEA), where the members discussed the development of an oil 
reserve for use in emergencies, plans to share their supplies if needed, and measures to reduce 
their dependence of Middle Eastern petroleum.
299
  
In the middle of the War, on 14 October, Kissinger wrote to King Faisal of Saudi Arabia that 
the U.S. “had no alternative but to begin an airlift of supplies to Israel following the Soviet 
massive airlift of arms to Arab states”. He added, “I hope, Your Majesty, you will understand 
that our airlift is not intended as anti-Arab”. He assured King Faisal that as soon as an 
effective ceasefire had been achieved, the United States was prepared to stop the airlift at 
once, provided the Soviets did the same.
300
 Prince Fahd, Second Deputy Prime Minister and 
Minister of the Interior of Saudi Arabia (1962-1975), had a meeting with an American official 
in Jidda, Saudi Arabia, on 15 October. There, he stated that Saudi Arabia had been offended 
by the language, tone, and content of Secretary Kissinger’s letter. He concluded that their 
relationship with the U.S. could never be the same again. Saudi Arabia was not considering 
breaking off diplomatic relations, but would possibly be compelled to support economic 
sanctions against the United States unless the U.S. stopped its resupply efforts to Israel and 
pushed the Israelis to withdraw to the pre-1967 borders.
301
 
These threats proved to be real, as on 17 October 1973, eleven members of the Organization 
of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries (OAPEC) announced that an oil embargo was being 
established with a five per cent cutback of oil production.
302
 This would be followed by 
monthly cutbacks until Israel withdrew to the 1967 borders pending that the United States 
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terminated its supplies of arms to Israel. At the same time, six Persian Gulf members of the 
Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) announced that they too would 
increase the price of oil by 70 per cent until Israel agreed to U.N. Resolution 242.
303
 Nixon 
and Kissinger had ignored the warnings of an impending oil boycott and continued the airlift 
to Israel at full speed.  Their goal was to increase the rate of deliveries to Israel until they 
were 25 per cent ahead of the Soviet deliveries to the Arab states. It was very important in the 
Nixon-Kissinger strategy to show the Soviet Union that the U.S. would not be pressured in 
any way and if they did, the U.S. would not hesitate to retaliate.
304
 This was an important 
strategy in the Nixon administration because this would, in their opinion, bring the Arab states 
that were supportive to the Soviet Union over to their side, and this would, in turn, increase 
the American influence in the region.
305
 
On 18 October, a personal emissary from King Faisal of Saudi Arabia arrived in Washington 
with another important message to the President. The message stated that unless Israel 
returned to the pre-1967 lines, and the U.S. stopped its airlift to the Israelis, an embargo 
would be put in place on all oil shipments to the United States. Despite these threats, the very 
next day, Nixon requested from Congress $2.2 billion in aid to Israel. On 20 October, 
therefore, Saudi Arabia implemented the embargo against the United States. The other 
OAPEC and OPEC countries soon followed, which had grave consequences for the rest of the 
American allies in Western Europe and Asia.
306
  
The consequences of the Arab oil embargo  
Even though the oil embargo was implemented, Kissinger did not believe it would be long 
lasting, at least not until 1974. In Kissinger’s book Years of Upheaval, he wrote that he could 
recall that in the beginning of the oil crisis, the Nixon administration believed that the 
embargo was “merely a symbolic gesture of limited practical importance.”307 This attitude 
was also reflected in a memorandum from the Office of Economic Research in the CIA from 
19 October 1973, where the CIA stated that if such an embargo went into effect, the 
repercussions would be relatively small, and that “after the first month, the brunt of the 
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cutback would fall on Europe and Japan.”308 In the same document, the CIA wrote “[o]n 
October 17 the Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries (OAPEC) decided to cut 
oil production…by not less than 5% a month until the Israeli withdrawal from occupied 
territories is completed and the ‘legal rights’ of the Palestinians restored. The Arab countries 
also promise to maintain oil deliveries to ‘friendly’ countries that give Arabs ‘effective 
material help’; and threatened a total embargo of countries that used their armed forces to aid 
Israel.” 309  The Nixon administration, and especially Kissinger, was now starting to get 
concerned by the impending oil crisis but wanted to deal with it after a cease-fire was put in 
place and the war had ended. Kissinger also believed that the United States could break it 
because he would not provide auspices for the negotiations until the Arab OPEC countries 
ended the embargo.
310
 
The beginning of the embargo, therefore, triggered increases in oil prices and cutbacks in 
production. 70 per cent of the oil consumption in Western Europe was provided by the Arab 
oil-producing states, and Japan‘s supply needs were around 40 per cent. The U.S. oil- and 
total energy consumption, on the other hand, were respectively only 12 and 5 per cent reliant 
on Arab oil.
311
  The oil producing states recognised that it was somewhat unjust to punish the 
Europeans and Japanese more than the United States, but saw no other option.
312
 Regardless 
of the Nixon administration’s doubts and light concerns, King Faisal of Saudi Arabia 
announced on 20 October, the day after Nixon had announced the $2.2 billion aid bill to 
Israel, that the oil embargo against the United States was being implemented as well as 
substantial cuts in production. Professor of Politics William B. Quandt wrote that “in 
retrospect, Kissinger wondered whether he had pushed too hard on the Arabs with the $2.2 
billion aid request just as the military situation was turning to Israel’s favour.”313 The OAPEC 
countries had clearly stated that the embargo would affect any country that was supportive to 
Israel and/or supported the country with military and financial means, so the aid bill to Israel 
certainly did not stop it. By December 1973, oil prices had quadrupled in Europe and the 
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United States, unemployment rates were high and the people were becoming desperate. 
Nevertheless, the Arab states were looking towards Washington now, not Moscow.
314 
 
Kissinger’s trip to Moscow and SCR 338 
On 19 October, Israel had won an important battle in the war, and Egypt admitted defeat. The 
Egyptian forces had to pull back because of Israeli forces gaining more and more territory on 
the West Bank of the Suez Canal. The Syrians were also losing ground to the IDF, but did not 
approve to Sadat’s acceptance of a cease fire. Nevertheless, they quickly understood that they 
had no choice but to join the Egyptians, as they had no chance of winning this war on their 
own.
315
 Consequently, on 20 October, Kissinger went to Moscow after receiving a message 
from the Soviet General Brezhnev urging the Secretary to come and work on a U.S.-Soviet 
Security Council Resolution (SCR) and peace negotiations.
316
  
In Moscow, on  21 October, Brezhnev and Kissinger agreed on a Security Council Resolution 
which “1) Call[ed] for a cease fire in place to be carried out within twelve hours of the 
adopting of the Security [Council Resolution]; 2) Include[d] that the Security Council 
Resolution 242 [would] be implemented in all its parts, and; 3) Contain[ed] the provision that, 
concurrently with the cease fire, negotiations between the parties would be started under 
appropriate auspices looking towards a final settlement.”317 Kissinger was happy about the 
outcome of the discussions because he knew that Israel would never accept the Arab states’ 
interpretation of SCR 242, which called for Israeli withdrawal to the pre-1967 borders. 
Therefore, the phrase “in all its parts” suggested that Security Council Resolution 242 would 
be considered as a package, and for Israel this meant that it did not have to withdraw from the 
territories captured in 1967 until it knew what each Arab government would give Israel in 
return. For the Arab states, this meant that they did not have to negotiate face-to-face with the 
Israelis because of the phrase “under appropriate auspices”.318 
Despite this breakthrough in diplomatic efforts, the oil embargo was still in place, and the 
OAPEC countries were not willing to end it unless the Security Council Resolution 242 was 
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realised, and Israel had gone back to the 1967 borders. Prince Fahd of Saudi Arabia wrote to 
Kissinger on 22 October,  
I feel that I can tell you very frankly and in confidence, in the spirit of friendship which we 
share, that my Government is going to be most hesitant and even reluctant to use its influence 
until and unless we are convinced that the intentions of the United States and the Soviet Union 
in their joint initiative is truly to implement Security Council Resolution 242 “in all its parts.” 
We know that the Israelis have their own interpretation of Security Council Resolution 242 that 
would be far from acceptance to ourselves and to other Arabs.
 319
  
Prince Fahd continued by saying “[u]ntil we can be confident that the United States and the 
Soviet Union truly intend jointly to uphold the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory 
by force, we lack the means by which to persuade our friends that acceptance and immediate 
implementation of the present resolution is in the Arab interests.”320 
Just before the U.N. Security Council was to convene and discuss what was to become 
Resolution 338, which was drafted by the U.S. and the Soviet Union, Israel accepted the 
cease-fire resolution. The cease-fire went into effect on Monday 22 October, but it did not last 
for long. On 23 October, Brezhnev sent a message to Kissinger saying that Israel had broken 
the cease-fire. The Soviet leader urged Kissinger to get Israel to withdraw to the positions it 
held during the acceptance of Resolution 338.
321
 The Israeli forces had now pushed forward 
and surrounded the Egyptian Third Army Corps and cut off its supplies. If the United States 
did not do something about the situation, it risked destroying its improving relations with the 
Soviet Union, and Kissinger’s role in the peace efforts would be jeopardised.322 
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A possible nuclear confrontation 
After Kissinger’s meeting in Moscow on 22 October, he flew straight to Tel Aviv for 
armistice negotiations. There, Kissinger had exchanged observances of the cease-fire with 
Meir, 
Kissinger: Did you get our message that if you need a few hours at the other end… 
Meir: What does a standstill ceasefire mean? 
Kissinger: Frankly, we haven’t thought it through… [but] You won’t get violent protests from 
Washington of something happens during the night [of 22-23 October], while I’m flying [to 
Washington). 
Meir: If they don’t stop, we won’t 
Kissinger: Even if they do…323 
 
The Secretary of State told Meir that she could take some more time to complete Israel’s 
military operations before abiding by the cease-fire and adopting U.N. Resolution 338, while 
Kissinger was flying back to the United States. The Secretary only made it clear that Israel 
should not try to destroy the Egyptian Third Army Corps.
324
 Furthermore, in the same 
meeting between Kissinger and Meir, the Israeli Prime Minister told Kissinger that “I know 
what you did. Without you, I don’t know where we would have been. I went to the airfield the 
other day and I watched the planes come in. It was more than I could ever have dreamed.”325 
Here, she was referring to the American airlift to Israel that Nixon had ordered on 13 October, 
and was one of the main causes for the oil embargo. 
When Kissinger returned home from his trips to Moscow and Tel Aviv, the Soviets and 
Egyptians urged the United States to intervene with the use of force against the Israelis, if 
necessary. Kissinger decided to send American ground observers into the area on 24 October 
instead. The reason for this was to make sure that Israel continued to be in a defensive 
position, and not carry on attaining new territory.
326
 Regardless of these efforts, there were 
more reports about Israel breaking the cease-fire and of the Israelis continuing to make their 
way deeper into Egyptian and Syrian lands. Brezhnev again tried to get the United States to 
do something about the continued Israeli breaking of the cease-fire, and warned that it was 
impossible to let this continue. He went on saying, “I will say it straight that if you find it 
impossible to act jointly with us in this matter, we should be faced with the necessity urgently 
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to consider the question of taking appropriate steps unilaterally. We cannot allow arbitrariness 
on the part of Israel.”327  
This message from Moscow made the Nixon administration concerned and angry. Nixon 
reportedly told Kissinger to take any necessary action, and called for a military alert of all 
American military forces and nuclear units, also known as DEFCON 3.
328
 This was a critical 
time in the U.S.-Soviet relationship, and made the possibility for a nuclear confrontation more 
imminent. Although there was never any real danger of a nuclear confrontation, both the 
Soviet Union and the United States threatened that it was not impossible. Nixon had a nuclear 
strategy that he had adopted in the beginning of his presidency; the “madman” strategy. The 
strategy conveyed the administration’s willingness to use excessive force, and threatened that 
nuclear weapons might be used in a crisis situation.
329
 This was also the strategy Nixon and 
Kissinger used during the end of the October War after the Soviet Union had started to send 
personnel to the area and appeared to intervene separately from the U.S.  After Nixon had 
called for an alert of all military forces, the Soviets seemed to stop pushing for an intervention 
in the conflict, and the crisis was averted.
330
  
On 24 October, the final cease-fire resolution was put in place and the war ended. The U.N. 
Security Council passed Resolution 340, which called for an immediate cease-fire, the return 
to the 22 October lines, dispatch of an enlarged U.N. observer force to the area, and 
implementation of Resolution 338.
331
 The war had finally come to an end, but it was not 
without its consequences. The October War had caused severe strains on American relations 
with the Arab countries because of the airlift to Israel. The Arab oil embargo, caused by the 
American backing of Israel and the military resupply effort to the country, made the U.S.’ 
relationship with its Western European and Japanese allies strained, and isolated Israel. For 
the United States, this was a high price to pay. Israel was supposed to enhance American 
interests, not jeopardized it like the country had done throughout the war.
332
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The aftermath of the October War 
The Egyptian Third Army was continually surrounded by Israeli Defence Force on 26 
October, and the situation was still tense despite the cease-fire. In a telephone conversation 
between Kissinger and the Israeli Ambassador Shimcha Dinitz (1973-1979), Kissinger 
suggested that the Israelis let the Egyptian army go home, or at least let the army receive food 
and water supplies. Dinitz told Kissinger that the Israelis would let the Egyptian army go 
home if the army were not shooting at the Israeli forces. Kissinger suggested that the Israelis 
could just let the army and their tanks go back to the rest of the Egyptian army, because the 
Soviets would replace its military equipment anyway. Dinitz answered, 
Dinitz: We will not open up the pocket and release an army that came to destroy us. It has never 
happened in a history of war. 
Kissinger: Also it has never happened that a small country is producing a world war in this 
manner. There is a limit beyond which you cannot push the President… 
Dinitz: We are not trying to push the President. 
Kissinger: You play your game and you will see what happens.
 333
 
 
The United States had finally begun to put heavy pressure on the Israelis to begin working 
toward permanent cease-fire agreements. If the U.S. was to become the new diplomatic 
superpower, the Americans had to prove to the Arab countries that they could deliver what 
they had promised. This would also weaken the Soviet influence in the area, which had been 
the United States’ goal all along. If Egypt and Syria did not get back the territories lost in the 
Six-Day War in 1967, they would realise that the United States was in fact the best ally to 
have, not the Soviet Union who had failed to get them what they wanted.
334
    
As Steven L. Spiegel wrote, “[i]n the period between 1973 and 1977, Kissinger, Nixon and 
Ford relied on diplomatic momentum and the carrots of trade, aid, and arms sales. Their aim 
was to expand the American role in the region at the expense of Russian influence. This 
would lead, they believed, to uninterrupted oil supplies as long as the new diplomatic process 
could be maintained.”335 The United States’ diplomatic efforts started immediately after the 
October War had ended. Kissinger travelled from country to country, encouraging 
disengagement agreements between Israel, Syria, and Egypt to get started. Although the war 
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had officially ended, there were still tensions between the parties in the conflict, and they 
were still in need of official agreements, not just resolutions. Israel and Egypt signed a 
disengagement agreement in January 1974, and the Israeli-Syrian agreement was signed in 
May 1974. Much of this was due to Kissinger’s extensive diplomatic efforts.336 
 
The Israel lobby and Henry Jackson 
There was a strong pro-Israeli atmosphere in the United States during President Nixon’s time 
in the White House, and especially during the October War. This mood had a strong impact 
on policymakers, even though Nixon did not believe the domestic opinion had any impact on 
his foreign policy-making.
337
 In 1969, Nixon had stated that “[u]nder no circumstances will 
domestic political considerations have any bearing on the decisions I make with regard to the 
Mideast.”338 The Democratic Senator Henry M. Jackson, one of the strongest pro-Israeli 
voices in the Congress, was asked in the 1970s whether the pro-Israel lobby was taking over 
Congress. According to the American political analyst and author Kathleen Christison, “[h]e 
scoffed at this notion, saying, ‘[t]hese people don’t understand. They refuse to realize that the 
American people support Israel. Americans, whether Gentile or Jew, respect competence. 
They like the idea that we are on the side which seems to know what it’s doing’.”339  
Israel’s victory in the previous wars had raised massive support from the evangelical 
Christians in the United States. They believed that these victories were a sign of God’s plan in 
human history. Therefore, Israel received a lot of financial contributions from wealthy 
Diaspora Jews and other well-off Americans. This money helped finance, among other things, 
Israel’s concealed nuclear program in the 1950s and 1960s.340 This money was untraceable, 
and once inside Israel, no one would know what the Israeli government would use it for. 
Author Donald Neff wrote, “[t]o America’s enemies, and some of its friends as well, the 
United States was not only guilty of condoning Israel’s expansion and occupation but of 
directly sharing in its transgressions against the Palestinians by its generous awards of aid that 
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helped finance internationally condemned practices.”341 U.S. military aid has also helped 
transform Israel’s armed forces into one of the most sophisticated militaries in the world. As 
Specialist in Middle East Affairs at the Congressional Research Service, Jeremy M. Sharp 
puts it, “US military aid for Israel has been designed to maintain Israel’s ‘qualitative military 
edge’ (QME) over neighbouring militaries, since Israel must rely on better equipment and 
training to compensate for a manpower deficit in any potential regional conflict. US military 
aid also helped Israel build a domestic defence industry, which ranks as one of the top 10 
suppliers of arms worldwide.”342 
In 1974, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, George Brown, held a lecture at Duke 
University about the Jewish influence in the country. Brown said,  
[i]t’s so strong you wouldn’t believe now. We have the Israelis coming to us for equipment. We 
say we can’t possibly get the Congress to support a program like that. They say, “Don’t worry 
about Congress. We’ll take care of the Congress.” Now this is somebody from another country, 
but they can do it. They own…the banks in this country, the newspapers…you just look at 
where the Jewish money is in this country.
343
 
Even though 1973 October War had been covered by the media, and the American public had 
come to see that because of Israel’s refusal to comply with the U.N. resolutions, the country 
had, in fact, started another war, and brought the world into an energy crisis, the support for 
Israel amongst the public and the U.S. government did not waver.  Now, more than ever, the 
Nixon administration regarded Israel as a firm Cold War ally to the United States, even 
though the war had been very costly for the U.S. and jeopardized its relationship with the 
Arab countries in the Middle East and the Soviet Union.
344
 
The American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) was one of the biggest pro-Israeli 
lobbying groups in the United States, and in 1970, they brought 1400 Jewish leaders from 31 
different states to Washington to protest against the Rogers Plan. There, they were able to see 
250 congressmen, which was almost half of the members of Congress. Nixon, and especially 
Kissinger, was against the Rogers Plan from the beginning, so it was not difficult to abide by 
the lobbyist’s calls. This proved, however, that the pro-Israeli advocates were a force to be 
reckoned with, and that it was impossible to ignore them.
345
 
                                                 
341
 Neff 1995: 184 
342
 Sharp 2009: 1 
343
 Spiegel 1985: 221, note 12. Washington Post, 13 November 1974, p. A9 
344
 Christison 2001: 125; Neff 1995: 177 
345
 Christison 2001: 137 
77 
 
 
The Jackson amendment 
Richard Nixon never had a strong electoral mandate or a big support in the Democratic 
Congress. The Congress frequently criticised the policies towards Israel, and sought to change 
them by making their point through speeches, letters, legislation and resolutions. These 
protests were led by Senator Henry Jackson, who was a presidential candidate in the elections 
in 1972 and 1976.
346
 Senator Jackson was a man with strong pro-Israeli sentiment, and was 
one of the strongest critics of détente and the SALT I agreement. He based this criticism on 
two issues. Firstly, he believed that Nixon and Kissinger had “bargained away American 
nuclear superiority” to the Soviet Union, and second; the United States’ indirect support of 
the Soviets’ emigration laws if the U.S. gave Moscow a Most Favoured Nation (MFN) status, 
today known as “normal trade relations”. This status would have given the Soviet Union the 
same financial and trade advantages as the United States, but the amendment put this on 
hold.
347
 
In June 1970, the Nixon administration had passed a Defence Procurement Act (also known 
as Defence Production Act). This was originally introduced in 1950, and is still a United 
States federal law. The Defence Procurement Act was created “to ensure the availability of 
the nation’s industrial resources to meet the national security need of the United States by 
granting the President authorities to ensure the supply and timely delivery of products, 
materials, and services to military and civilian agencies.”348 The Jackson Amendment would 
be a part of the Act, and the administration needed it to be approved “in order to have the 
power to negotiate a multilateral agreement for the reduction of tariffs and other disincentives 
to free trade.”349  
The Senate adopted the Jackson Amendment to the Defence Procurement Act in 1972, but it 
was already introduced in 1970 as a consequence of the deepened Soviet involvement in the 
Middle East during the War of Attrition (1969-1970). To restore the balance in the Middle 
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East, it became important to furnish Israel with the means to provide for its own security.
350
 
This bill also had the effect of the President’s ability to grant aircrafts and other military 
equipment to Israel. The key passage in the Jackson Amendment reads: 
The President is authorized to transfer to Israel, by sales, credit sale or guarantee, such aircraft, 
and equipment appropriate to use, maintain and protect such aircraft, as may be necessary to 
counteract any past, present, or future increased military assistance provided to other countries 
of the Middle East. Any such sale, credit sale, or guarantee shall be made on terms and 
conditions not less favorable than those extended to other countries which receive the same or 
similar types of aircraft equipment.
351
  
In September 1970, the Jackson Amendment is was mentioned in a memorandum for General 
Haig from Harold H. Saunders. This paper was being drafted during the War of Attrition and 
would be used during the Jordan Civil War in September 1970. In this paper, it was 
recommended that the Nixon administrations should use the Jackson Amendment as the main 
legislative vehicle for assistance to Israel, and was concluded to be used as the principal 
instrument of assistance for Israel in Fiscal Year (FY) 1971.
352
 The reasons for this were,  
1) It would be responsive to the sentiment on the [Capitol] Hill. 
2) It would probably be available soon 
3) It is appropriate to Israel’s military-based needs 
4) It does not create any precedents for making grant assistance available to a developed 
country but does not preclude our switching to grant assistance if circumstances should 
warrant it. 
5) It would allow the extensions of assistance on liberal terms.353 
 
Just after this was concluded, the SAM package for Israel, in October 1970, was decided 
upon, and in December 1971, the first long-term arms deal between the U.S. and Israel 
became a reality.
354
 The Jackson Amendment gave the President the authority to provide 
Israel with the equipment that would maintain the balance of power in the Middle East, 
something Nixon and Kissinger deemed crucial to the stability of the region. Senator Jackson 
also declared that the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) credit terms were inappropriate for Israel, 
and stated that he had in mind assistance on concessionary terms – “repayment on the order of 
25 years or more, and rates of interests that would be negligible – and certainly 
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concessionary.”355 This meant that the United States would give Israel a lower interest rate, 
which they did not provide many countries. Senator Jackson believed that Israel was entitled 
to this kind of treatment because of the many conflicts it had been through since its creation in 
1948. Israel was in fact doing really well, and was one of the countries with the highest 
economic growth at that time. Regardless, Jackson still believed that the Israelis would not be 
able to pay back their loans to the U.S. without substantial sacrifices unless they had a long 
deadline.
356
  
 
Jackson-Vanik 1972 
In October 1972, Moscow held a summit meeting with the United States where they 
completed a major trade agreement. This would have given the Soviet Union MFN status if 
the agreement went through. During the same month Henry Jackson, together with 
Representative Charles Vanik, presented two draft bills to Congress that were to become the 
Jackson-Vanik Amendment, an improved version of the Jackson Amendment.
357
 The reason 
behind the Jackson-Vanik Amendment was the expensive education tax that was placed upon 
all Soviet citizens that wanted to emigrate from the Soviet Union. In reality, it was only the 
Jewish citizens that were allowed to emigrate and the tax, therefore, was mainly applied to 
them.
358
   
Moscow deeply wanted MFN status but were stopped because, as Julie Ginsberg writes: “[t]o 
comply with the amendment, the applicable countries may not deny their citizens the right to 
emigrate, impose a significant tax on emigration or related documents, or otherwise 
monetarily punish any citizen for seeking to emigrate.”359 This was precisely what the Soviet 
Union had done, but because of pressure from the United States, the Kremlin put an end to the 
education tax in late 1972. The amendment, however, was still included in the American 
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Trade Act in 1974, and tied the granting of the Soviet’s MFN status to them lifting the 
restrictions on the number of emigrants from the Soviet Union.
360
  
The Soviet emigration issue was very important to Israel together with the American public. 
Many Israelis came from Soviet Jewish descent, and several had emigrated from the USSR. 
Therefore, it was important for the Israeli community to bring as many Soviet Jews to Israel 
as possible, since it was essential for Israel to have a high Jewish population.
361
 When Golda 
Meir became Prime Minister of Israel in 1969, she faced the problem of how to avoid a 
confrontation with the Kremlin, while at the same time maintaining a good relationship with 
the U.S. The White House was reluctant to launch a campaign against the Soviet emigration 
policies in fear of making the Cold War warmer, but the Congress supported the Jackson-
Vanik Amendment to the fullest.
362
  
Nixon and Kissinger had ignored the Amendment since its creation. They wanted to continue 
détente between themselves and the Soviet Union. The Amendment became a risk to this 
relationship. The Israeli government did support Jackson, and sent several messages to Nixon, 
urging him to implement the Amendment and to put pressure on Moscow to change its 
emigration policies. Nixon would not listen, and in 1973, the President sent the Trade Reform 
Act to the Congress. This included requirements that would have given MFN status to the 
Soviet Union, and it also excluded the connections to the emigration issue. Because of this, 76 
senators, including Henry Jackson, reciprocated by reintroducing the Jackson Amendment, 
and making it a part of the Act.
363
 
Nixon and Kissinger were very much against the Jackson-Vanik Amendment, and saw no 
need to interfere in Soviet internal politics. During the first days of the October War in 1973, 
Kissinger told the Israelis that if the U.S. would begin its resupply efforts to Israel, the Israelis 
and the American Jewish community had to withdraw their support for the Amendment. 
Because of this dilemma, Meir declared Israel neutral in the issue of Jackson-Vanik between 
the White House and Congress. Although the Israeli Prime Minister maintained a posture of 
neutrality, the Israelis secretly ran an effective campaign supporting the Amendment because 
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it “addressed some of their most fundamental emotional dispositions and ideological 
goals.”364  
As a result of Richard Nixon’s preoccupation with the Watergate scandal, it was Kissinger 
that had to try and block the Jackson-Vanik Amendment. He did not succeed because, “[h]e 
was too wedded to a realistic outlook and to the strategic design of détente to fully grasp the 
deep ideological attraction Jackson-Vanik had for Americans: it enabled America to regain 
the moral high ground it had lost in Vietnam and it appealed to two pillars of the American 
self-image: a ‘nation of immigrants’ and a ‘redeemer nation’.”365 
In 1974, the Jackson-Vanik Amendment became a part of the United States’ Trade Act. The 
implementation of the amendment impacted the American relationship with Israel by 
allowing the Jewish state more time in repaying its loans, as well as increasing amounts of 
military equipment. The relationship with the Soviet Union became more strained, and was 
the start of the decline of détente. Brezhnev was not happy about the way the agreement of 
MFN status had turned out, or the United States’ interference in domestic Soviet disputes. In a 
meeting between the Soviet General and Kissinger on 24 October 1974, Brezhnev complained 
about the United States’ failure to abide by the 1972 agreement. Kissinger commented that “I 
have believed and have said publicly that it was a mistake for the United States to involve 
itself in an internal Soviet issue. But all the blame… belonged to Jackson, whose manner is as 
humiliating for me as it is for you.”366At home, Kissinger was the one that received the most 
criticism for not being on the Israelis side in the matter of the Soviet emigrants because he 
had been against the Amendment. Even though this criticism had some effect on Kissinger’s 
political life, he still remained Secretary of State and National Security Adviser for the new 
president Gerald Ford after Richard Nixon’s resignation from office on 9 August 1974.367 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
364
 Kochavi 2009: 5 
365
 Ibid 
366
 Hanhimäki 2004: 369 
367
 Ibid 
82 
 
6 Summary and Conclusion 
I have set as my goal the attainment of a generation of peace. I believe that arms control 
presents both a necessary and promising road toward a stable, secure world in which true peace 
can exist – Richard M. Nixon, 1971.368 
 
Throughout Richard Nixon’s presidency the deliveries of military and financial aid to Israel 
were substantial. The Nixon administration provided Israel with aircrafts and other military 
equipment worth billions of dollars, and secured Israel’s military supremacy in the Middle 
East. The introduction of the Jackson Amendment in 1970 authorised the President to provide 
additional military equipment to Israel, and Nixon used this authority several times during his 
presidency. The sale of Phantom’s and Skyhawk’s to Israel escalated and the Israeli 
government managed to obtain a nuclear arsenal. 
It is possible to assume that the Nixon administration did not have a firm set of policies or did 
not form any particular doctrine with regards to the arms policy towards Israel when Nixon 
took office in January 1969. It is implied that the policies were formed as the events unfolded, 
and the weapons deliveries and sales to Israel were shaped thereafter. 
 
Arms policy towards Israel 
This thesis has shown that there have been several different motives behind the American 
arms sales towards Israel between 1969 and 1974. The most prominent American motives 
were firstly, to dampen Soviet influence in the world whilst halt the spread of communism; 
secondly, increase the U.S.’ own power in the Middle East by enlisting more allies, and 
undermining Soviet influence; third, to secure other American interests in the region, mainly 
oil; and fourth, to satisfy the pro-Israeli public opinion and the survival of Israel. 
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Dampen Soviet influence 
Nixon came to power believing that the Arab world had joined forces with the Soviet Union 
and that this had to be dealt with by increasing the United States’ own power in the Middle 
East. Israel was the golden ticket that could secure American interests and stop Soviet 
expansion, thereby halt the spread of communism throughout the world. The President and his 
National Security Advisor believed that increased aid and a steadfast support for Israel would 
eventually reveal the inadequate value of Soviet aid and convince the Soviet Union’s clients 
in the Middle East to cooperate with Washington instead. Nixon and Kissinger believed that 
Israel’s military superiority would expose Soviet weakness. Therefore, Washington needed a 
strategically placed, strong and loyal ally in the Middle East, and after the Jordan Civil War in 
1970, Israel had proven to be an ally of high value. 
To undermine the Soviet Union’s influence in the region, the United States pursued a policy 
of downplaying its arms shipments to Israel, and conveying different strategies to the different 
parties involved in the Arab-Israeli conflict. When Secretary of State William P. Rogers 
presented the Rogers Plan in 1970, which called for Israeli withdrawal from territories 
occupied in the 1967-War and the Arab states' acknowledgement of Israel’s existence, Nixon 
emitted to the impression of supporting the plan in hope of making the Arab states consider 
reopening its relationship with Washington. To the Israeli government, however, Nixon 
assured that he had no intention of pursuing the Rogers Plan. 
It became very important for the Nixon administration to increase its arms sales to Israel as a 
consequence of Soviet shipments to Egypt and other allies in the Middle East. The Soviet 
Union had also provided several thousand tons of equipment to Syria and Egypt at the end of 
Nixon’s presidency, and to maintain the military balance of power in the Middle East, the 
United States had to supply additional aircrafts to Israel. Contrary to Nixon and Kissinger’s 
believes, it was concluded in 1970 that Israel was in fact superior to any Arab state in the 
region, and it was therefore no particular need for furnishing Israel with more military 
equipment.  
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The pursuit of oil 
The oil in the Middle East was also important to the Washington policymakers, and in 
extension, the states that were in the possession of the oil reserves in the region. Despite of 
this emphasis on the oil reservoir in the Middle East, the Arab oil embargo on all shipments to 
the United States after the October War was a direct consequence of the United States’ 
support for Israel. The embargo strained Washington’s relationship with its Western European 
allies, as well as the Arab countries in the Middle East. The U.S. had received several 
warnings from Saudi Arabia prior to its implementation, but Kissinger did not take these 
threats seriously. Was the Middle Eastern oil not that important to the United States after all? 
Kissinger believed that an embargo would not be implemented until sometime in 1974, and 
that the United States had the power to stop it. The Americans did not have the power to halt 
an embargo, and on 20 October 1973, the Arab oil embargo was erected. The world was now 
thrown into an energy crisis that would last throughout the remainder of Nixon’s presidency. 
 
A pro-Israeli society 
The pro-Israeli public opinion was strong in the United States during the 1970s and the pro-
Israeli lobby steadily increased in numbers. In the 1960s, President Kennedy had opened up 
for giving Jewish leaders, Israeli embassy officials and pro-Israeli Congressmen immediate 
access to the White House. This policy would remain under Nixon’s presidency and made it 
difficult for the American administration to pursue policies that were not favourable to the 
state of Israel. This had a big impact on the policy-making and a strong influence on the arms 
policy towards Israel. The Israelis also regarded the Nixon administration’s decisions on arms 
sales to their country as a test of U.S. support and commitment to Israel. This made it difficult 
for the American government to not provide what the Israelis deemed necessary for Israel’s 
survival.  
The Israel lobbying groups would campaign on the behalf of Israel inside the United States, 
and could influence the presidential elections by affecting the voting in the Congress and 
support the President with high turnout rates during the elections. Israel had many friends in 
the U.S. to lobby its cause and this was usually highly effective. 
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Different weapons in high quantities sold to Israel 
From 1969 to 1974, the United States’ relationship with Israel transformed. The previous 
administrations had begun providing Israel with modest amounts of military equipment and 
financial aid, with President Kennedy’s HAWK deal in 1962, and President Johnson’s 
Phantom’s deal in 1968. It was not until Nixon and Kissinger became the main architects of 
foreign policy in the early 1970s, however, that this relationship truly changed.  
The escalation of financial aid was apparent, rising from $102.0 million in 1970 to $643.5 
million in 1971. 85 per cent of this aid consisted of military assistance. After the October War 
in 1973 the aid to Israel increased fivefold, stabilising at around $3 billion a year in loans and 
grants, making Israel the largest recipient of American foreign assistance in the world. 
The different arms packages in the 1970s arose as a consequence of increased Israeli 
assistance requests, and the anti-SAM package in October 1970 accounted for $163.7 million 
and contained SAM surface-to-air missiles, anti-SAM equipment, SHRIKE anti-radiation 
missiles, and other highly sophisticated weapons. The real turning point in the 
administration’s commitment to Israel came in 1971 with the first long-term arms deal with 
Israel in U.S. history. The Israelis had pressured the United States into making a firm 
commitment on the grounds that Israel was being threatened from all sides of its borders. The 
three previously fought Arab-Israeli wars also created a common thought amongst the 
American public that Israel was constantly under attack from its neighbouring countries. The 
Israeli Government emphasised that the Arab states wanted to terminate the state of Israel and 
needed the military equipment to maintain its military might and its much needed security. 
Since the Israelis regarded weapon deliveries as a symbol of American support for the 
survival and well-being of Israel, Nixon and Kissinger approved the long-term arms deal 
between the two countries.  
The long-term arms deal of December 1971 provided Israel with the security of knowing that 
weapons were being provided. For the United States, this meant that Israel would stop 
pressuring Washington for more military equipment and could thereby avoid repeated 
discussions whenever the short term agreements expired. The Soviet Union also began 
providing large amounts of sophisticated military equipment to its allies in the Middle East. 
To contain this threat of increased Soviet influence in the region, Nixon and Kissinger 
believed in the power of Israel. 
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The State Department was against the creation of such an agreement, especially in the midst 
of negotiations with Egypt about a possible interim agreement with Israel. The Department 
believed that this would most likely have negative effects on the U.S.’ diplomatic relations 
with the Arab countries in the Middle East and contribute to an increased Soviet presence in 
the region. Kissinger and Nixon assumed that the arms deliveries to Israel would eventually 
lead to a peace settlement because of the Israelis being more inclined to follow American 
initiatives. By providing the Israelis with what they wanted in terms of military equipment, 
Nixon and Kissinger believed that the United States would have some leverage to hold over 
the Israeli Government if they did not want to participate in diplomatic initiatives concerning 
a peace settlement and the implementation of Resolution 242. 
As history has shown, Israel’s military supremacy did not lead to the end of the Arab-Israeli 
conflict and Israel was not more inclined to negotiate and address a possibility for a 
withdrawal from the territories occupied in the Six-Day War in 1967 during the Nixon 
administration’s time in the White House. However, Nixon and Kissinger did manage to 
increase American influence in the region with Kissinger’s shuttle diplomacy after the 1973 
October War and made the U.S. one of the most prominent diplomatic powers in the Middle 
East.  
 
Extensive assistance 
The military assistance to Israel was extensive and derived as a consequence of several 
incidents during this period in time. The big amount of military assistance was not something 
the Nixon administration had planned, and the different bodies in the administration had 
contrasting opinions and understandings over the need for increased military assistance for 
Israel. 
The large magnitude of the military assistance provided to Israel during the Nixon years was 
influenced by several factors. The administration had concluded that Israel’s assistance needs 
had been somewhat exaggerated from the Israeli government. Israel had the military ability to 
win an overwhelming victory against simultaneous Arab attacks and was even beginning to 
develop its own arms industry. Regardless of of the reports and conclusions, Nixon and 
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Kissinger did provide almost all of the Israeli requests for more military equipment, and 
deemed it necessary for Israel’s safety and for the protection of American interests in the area. 
The Jackson Amendment introduced in 1970, provided the President the authority to arrange 
for sales, credit sales or by guarantees, the necessary military equipment to “counteract any 
past, present or future increased military assistance provided to other countries.”369 Seeing as 
the State Department had reservations about the long-term arms deal with Israel in 1971, it is 
possible to assume that the President now held the power to bypass the Departments if he 
deemed it necessary. In addition, it was Nixon who approved the airlift to Israel during the 
October War, and blamed the State Department for delaying the resupply effort. Nixon had 
been preoccupied with the Watergate scandal, and was only being informed how the war 
unfolded through telephone conversations with Kissinger. It is difficult to say whether 
Kissinger had informed the President about a possible delay on the behalf of the State 
Department, or not. Nevertheless, Nixon ordered the biggest airlift in American history to 
Israel on 14 October 1973. The goal was to deliver 25 per cent more than the Soviet Union, to 
keep a constant ratio of military equipment in the Middle East in favour of Israel. 
Israel did in some way exploit the U.S. and knew which buttons to push to get what it wanted. 
If the United States tried to pressure Israel in any way, the Israelis would usually deny any 
form of participation in the diplomatic initiatives provided by the United States in the 1970s. 
Only when weapons were being delivered, the Israelis could consider participating in the 
negotiations and this contributed to its continuously growing military arsenal.  
The Nixon administration did not provide the entire amount of the Israelis’ arms requests, but 
most of it. Nixon and Kissinger did not involve the United States in the Arab-Israeli conflict 
predominantly to aid and secure Israel. They sought to promote the United States’ own 
interests, and which one of these interests got the highest priority was up to them and their 
electorate to decide. As this study shows, Israel and the pro-Israeli lobbying groups in the 
United States had a major influence on the decision-making process of the American 
government. Since Israel was a country made by immigrants, the Israeli strive for a homeland 
derived substantial support from the American population. Even though the relationship 
between Israel and the United states had its ups and downs, the bond between the two 
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countries was strengthened during Nixon's presidency and would only grow stronger in the 
years to come. The arms sales to the region continued and the United States would continue to 
be Israel’s main benefactor and ally.  
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Appendix A – Directory of People, Terms 
and Abbreviations 
 
Brezhnev, Leonid – General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of 
the Soviet Union (1964-1982) 
Brown, George – Assistant to the Chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff (1966-1968), Chief of 
Staff of the U.S. Air Force (1973-1974), Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (1974-1977) 
Dayan, Moshe – Israeli officer. Minister of Defence (1967-1974 
Dinitz, Simcha – Israeli Ambassador to the United States (1973-1974) 
Dobrynin, Anatoly – Soviet Ambassador to the United States (1962-1986) 
Dulles, John Foster – U.S. Secretary of State (1953-1959) 
Eisenhower, Dwight D. – President of the United States (1953-1961) 
Ford, Gerald R. – Vice President of the United States (1973-1974), President of the United 
States (1974-1977) 
Haig, Alexander – NSC Military Assistant to the National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger 
(1969-1970), Deputy National Security Advisor to Henry Kissinger (1970-1973), White 
House Chief of Staff (1973-1974) 
Jackson, Henry – U.S. Congressman and Senator from the state of Washington (1941-1983) 
Jarring, Gunnar – Swedish Diplomat. U.N. appointed Special Envoy for the Middle East 
peace process after the 1967 Arab-Israeli War. His mission was to achieve a peaceful Arab-
Israeli settlement, also known as the ‘Jarring mission’, and ‘Jarring talks’. 
Johnson, Lyndon B. – President of the United States (1963-1969) 
Kennedy, John F. – President of the United States (1961-1963). He was assassinated in 
November 1963. 
90 
 
Kissinger, Dr. Henry A. – U.S. National Security Advisor (1969-1975), Secretary of State 
(1973-1977) 
Meir, Golda – Prime Minister of Israel (1969-1974) 
Nasser, Gamal Abdel – Prime Minister of Egypt (1954-1962), President of Egypt/ the United 
Arab Republic (1956-1970) 
Nixon, Richard M. – Vice President of the United States (1952-1960), President of the 
United States (1969-1974) 
Peres, Shimon – Israeli Minister of Defence (1974-1977) 
Rabin, Yitzhak – Israeli Ambassador to the United States (1968-1973), Prime Minister of 
Israel (1974-1977) 
Rogers, William P. – U.S. Secretary of State (1969-1973) 
Sadat, Anwar al. – Vice President of Egypt (1969-1970), President of Egypt (1970-1981) 
Saunders, Harold “Hal” H. – NSC Staff Member/ Senior Staff member (1961-1974), 
Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (1974-1975) 
Scowcroft, Brent – American officer. Military Assistant to President Nixon (1972-1973), 
Deputy National Security Advisor (1973-1975) 
Sisco, Joseph “Joe” J. – U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs (1969-
1974) 
Truman, Harry S. – President of the United States (1945-1953) 
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Abbreviations and Terms 
CIA – Central Intelligence Agency 
Douglas A-4 Skyhawk - or ‘Skyhawks’. An American made attack aircraft 
Fatah – Palestinian National Liberation Movement 
FRUS – Foreign Relations of the United States 
FY – Fiscal Year 
IAF – Israel Air Force 
IDF – Israel Defence Force 
Lockheed C-5 Galaxy – also known as ‘C-5’, a large U.S. military transport aircraft used 
during the American airlift to Israel in 1973 
Mikoyan-Gurevich MiG – high-subsonic fighter aircraft produced in the Soviet Union from 
1952. 
McDonnell Douglas F-4 Phantom II – or ‘Phantoms’, is a tandem two-seat, twin-engine, 
long-range supersonic jet interceptor fighter-bomber originally developed for the United 
States Navy. By the mid-1960s had become a major part of their respective air wings, as well 
as the IDFs. 
NSC – National Security Council 
NSSM – National Security Study Memoranda 
NSDM – National Security Decision Memoranda 
PLO – Palestine Liberation Organization. Formally set up in 1964 with the aim of creating an 
independent State of Palestine 
SAM - A surface-to-air missile (SAM) designed to be launched from the ground to destroy 
aircraft or other missiles. It is one type of antiaircraft system. 
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Shuttle Diplomacy – The term describes Henry Kissinger’s diplomatic tactics as a mediator 
in the aftermath of the 1973 October War. Kissinger, a team of White House Department 
staffers, and a press corps flying between Middle Eastern Heads of State government to 
convey proposals and ideas for furthering negotiations. 
SRG – Senior Review Group 
Suez – referring to the Suez Canal or the Suez Crisis/War 
United Arab Republic (UAR) – Name of Union between Syria and Egypt from 1958 to 1961 
when Syria seceded from the Union. Egypt continued to be known officially as the "United 
Arab Republic" until 1971. 
U.N. – United Nations 
USSR – Union of Soviet Socialist Republic, or ‘the Soviet Union’ 
WSAG – Washington Special Actions Group. A crisis management forum created as part of 
Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger’s reformation of the National Security Council 
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Appendix B – Maps 
B 1: Middle East 1970
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B-2: Israel 1972
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Appendix C, United Nations Security 
Council Resolution 242 (1967) 
Resolution 242 (1967) 
of 22 November 1967.
372
 
 
The Security Council, 
Expressing its continuing concern with the grave situation in the Middle East,        
Emphasizing the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war and the need to work for 
a just and lasting peace in which every state in the area can live in security,           
Emphasizing further that all Member States in their acceptance of the Charter of the United 
Nations have undertaken a commitment to act in accordance with Article 2 of the Charter, 
1. Affirms that the fulfilment of Charter principles requires the establishment of a just     
and lasting peace in the Middle East which should include the application of both the 
following principles: (i) Withdrawal of Israel armed forces from territories occupied in the 
recent conflict; (ii) Termination of all claims or states of belligerency and respect for and 
acknowledgment of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of 
every State in the area and their right to live in peace within secure and recognized 
boundaries free from threats or acts of force;  
2. Affirms the necessity 
(a) For guaranteeing freedom of navigation through international waterways in the area; 
(b) For achieving a just settlement of the refugee problem; 
(c) For guaranteeing the territorial inviolability and political independence of every State 
in the area, through measures including the establishment of demilitarized zones; 
                                                 
372
  Resolution 242 (1967), United Nations Security Council, 22 November 1967: 
http://unispal.un.org/unispal.nsf/0/7D35E1F729DF491C85256EE700686136. 
96 
 
3. Requests the Secretary-General to designate a Special Representative to proceed to the 
Middle East to establish and maintain contacts with the State concerned in order to 
promote agreement and assist efforts to achieve a peaceful and accepted settlement in 
accordance with the provisions and principles in this resolution; 
4. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council on the progress of the 
efforts of the Special Representative as soon as possible.  
Adopted unanimously at the 1382
nd
 meeting. 
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Appendix D – United Nations Security 
Council Resolution 338 (1973) 
 
Resolution 338 (1973)                                                                                                                                       
of 22 October 1973.
373
 
The Security Council, 
1. Calls upon all parties to the present fighting to cease all firing and terminate all 
military activity immediately, no later than 12 hours after the moment of the adoption 
of this decision, in the positions they now occupy; 
2. Calls upon the parties concerned to start immediately after the cease-fire the 
implementation of Security Council Resolution 242 (1967) in all of its parts; 
3. Decides that, immediately and concurrently with the cease-fire, negotiations shall start 
between the parties concerned under appropriate auspices aimed at establishing a just 
and durable peace in the Middle East.  
Adopted at the 1747
th
 meeting by 14 votes to none. 
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Appendix E – United Nations Security 
Council Resolution 340 (1973) 
Resolution 340 (1973) 
25 October 1973.
374
 
The Security Council, 
Recalling its resolutions 338 (1973) of 22 October and 339 (1973) of 23 October 1973. 
Noting with regret the reported repeated violations of the cease-fire in non-compliance with 
resolutions 338 (1973) and 339 (1973), 
Noting with concern from the Secretary-General’s report 1/ that the United Nations military 
observers have not yet been enabled to place themselves on both sides of the cease-fire line, 
1. Demands that immediate and complete cease-fire be observed and that the parties 
return to the positions occupied by them at 1650 hours GMT on 22 October 1973; 
2. Requests the Secretary-General, as an immediate step, to increase the number of 
United Nations military observers on both sides; 
3. Decides to set up immediately, under its authority, a United Nations Emergency Force 
to be composed of personnel drawn from State Members of the United Nations except 
the permanent members of the Security Council, and requests the Secretary-General to 
report within 24 hours on the steps taken to this effect; 
4. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Council on an urgent and continuing 
basis on the state of implementation of the present resolution, as well as resolutions 
338 (1973) and 339 (1973); 
5. Requests all Member States to extend their full co-operation to the United Nations and 
the implementation of the present resolution, as well as resolutions 338 (1973) and 
339 (1973). 
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Adopted at the 1750
th
 meeting by 14 votes to none. 
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